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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has read the legal literature on the subject knows two things
about originalism and affirmative action.  They know that originalism
strongly supports the constitutionality of affirmative action and that the two
originalist justices—Justices Scalia and Thomas—appear to be hypocrites for
holding that the Constitution forbids government affirmative action.  At
least, these are the claims of various leading scholars, including Cass Sunstein
and Jed Rubenfeld.1
What is peculiar, however, is how confident these assertions about the
Constitution’s original meaning and the hypocrisy of the Justices are, and
how insubstantial the evidence is that is said to support these claims.  The
claims of original meaning are based on a set of federal statutes passed at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment that are thought to provide race-based
benefits to blacks.  But these statutes do not provide strong evidence that the
Fourteenth Amendment allows race-based government actions that benefit
blacks or other minorities.  These were federal statutes that were not gov-
erned by the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore were not directly
informative of its meaning.  Moreover, most of these statutes, and perhaps
virtually all of them, are not necessarily best interpreted as providing race-
based benefits.
In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly
allows the states to engage in affirmative action.  I argue that the original
meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is con-
stitutional.2  Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made
that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional.  In fact, based
on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to
laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows
affirmative action.  I do not, however, take the next step and argue that the
Constitution’s original meaning forbids affirmative action.  That would
require a satisfactory understanding of the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, an understanding that I do not believe we currently
possess.
This Article, then, contests both of the basic claims made by the critics.
It argues that the original meaning can reasonably be interpreted as prohibit-
1 See infra Part III.
2 The Article does not address the issue of the constitutionality of affirmative action
by the federal government, which raises distinct issues.
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ing affirmative action and that the originalist Justices are therefore not being
inconsistent or hypocritical by supporting a colorblind Constitution.  I do,
however, agree with one significant complaint that the critics make of Justices
Scalia and Thomas.  These Justices have not made any real effort to justify
their affirmative action opinions based on the Constitution’s original mean-
ing.  Instead, their decisions have relied on a combination of precedent,
moral claims, and legal principles.  As originalists, these Justices should have
grounded their arguments in the original meaning.  This Article argues that,
had they done so, they would have had a basis in the original meaning to
support their views.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the opinions of Justices Scalia and
Thomas on affirmative action, showing that they both view the Fourteenth
Amendment as adopting the principle of a colorblind Constitution.  In Part
II, I then move on to the views of Cass Sunstein, Jed Rubenfeld, and other
critics of the two originalist Justices, who argue that originalism strongly sup-
ports the constitutionality of affirmative action.
Part III then explores the federal statutes relied upon by the critics of
Justices Scalia and Thomas.  First, this Part asks whether these federal laws—
assuming that they provide special benefits to blacks—are fairly interpreted
as informing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  If the equality
component of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the federal govern-
ment, I argue that these federal statutes would constitute some evidence of
the Amendment’s meaning.  But this evidence would be far from conclusive,
since it would at best be the view of the Congress, which might be mistaken
or biased.
Once one recognizes that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
the federal government, the connection between this federal legislation and
the Amendment’s meaning becomes far more attenuated.  I argue that the
federal legislation was unlikely to have reflected the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the federal government was purposefully
excluded from the Amendment.  The best explanation for why the Amend-
ment excluded the federal government is that the enactors believed the fed-
eral government could be trusted far more than the states.  While the
Congress likely believed that the federal government should not engage in
arbitrary racial discrimination, it allowed this norm to be enforced solely
through a principle of political morality.
The Part then examines these federal statutes to determine whether they
in fact provide race-based benefits to blacks.  It turns out that many, and
perhaps virtually all, of these statutes do not discriminate on the basis of race.
In particular, the important Freedmen’s Bureau Acts do not racially discrimi-
nate, but instead provide benefits to former slaves that are not best under-
stood as involving race.  Moreover, four of the five remaining statutes that
initially appear to provide benefits based on the race of the recipient do not
upon examination necessarily turn out to do so.  In each of these cases, there
is at least a reasonable interpretation of the statute that would render it to
not confer special race-based benefits to blacks.  The last statute does appear
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to confer such benefits, but it may turn out to confer them on considerably
narrower grounds than the critics suggest.
Part III concludes by examining various federal laws, largely ignored by
the critics, that discriminated against blacks or other minorities.  While the
logic of the critics’ interpretation suggests that these laws should also inform
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, that would then suggest that
the states could discriminate significantly against blacks.  The better interpre-
tation, I contend, is to view these laws as also not significantly informing the
Amendment’s meaning.
While Part III argues that the originalist evidence relied upon by the
critics to support affirmative action is weak, Part IV argues that there is rela-
tively strong originalist evidence in favor of the colorblind Constitution.  This
section explores two leading and representative theories of the original
meaning of the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment to show
that they are reasonably interpreted to support the colorblind Constitution.
These theories are John Harrison’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause to protect against caste legislation and Michelle Saunders’s
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit class legislation.
Harrison’s theory interprets the Privileges or Immunities Clause to prohibit
state laws that racially discriminate either for or against blacks.  While Saun-
ders’s theory interprets the Equal Protection Clause not to prohibit all race-
based legislation, but only special laws that lack an adequate public purpose
justification, I argue that her interpretation needs to be revised to take into
account certain aspects of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Once those revisions are made, Saunders’s theory suggests that state racial
discrimination should probably be subject to even stricter scrutiny than she
suggests.
I. THE ORIGINALISTS’ COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION
The objects of the scholars’ criticisms are Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s
affirmative action opinions.  These two Justices have adopted the position
that the Constitution is colorblind and therefore does not permit racial dis-
tinctions.  They argue that all racial distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny
and that virtually no racial distinctions pass muster.  Yet, these two Justices,
who have espoused originalism, have not explained how these interpreta-
tions derive from the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning.  To pro-
vide a sense of their arguments, I review their main affirmative action
opinions.
A. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia explained his view of the unconstitutionality of affirmative
action most completely in his sole concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.3  In Croson, Richmond, Virginia had adopted a minority business
3 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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utilization plan that required prime contractors who won bids for city con-
tracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contracts to one
or more minority business enterprises.4  The record revealed “no direct evi-
dence of race discrimination on the part of the city,” nor evidence that the
city’s prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned
subcontractors.5
The Supreme Court held that Richmond’s plan was an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.6  Justice O’Connor wrote an opin-
ion, parts of which were for a majority of the Justices and other parts merely
for a plurality.  The majority held that the city had not established a compel-
ling governmental interest justifying the plan, because the city had not shown
the type of identified past discrimination in the city’s construction industry
that would have justified race-based relief under the Equal Protection
Clause.7
Writing solely for himself, Justice Scalia authored an opinion that con-
curred in the judgment.  Scalia agreed with O’Connor’s opinion that strict
scrutiny must be applied to all government racial classifications, but dis-
agreed that states may in some circumstances discriminate based on race in
order to remedy past race discrimination.8
Scalia wrote that “discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.”9
At least where state government action is involved, “only a social emergency
rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a
prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates . . . can justify an
exception” to the colorblindness principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
Scalia argued that there are “many permissible ways” that a state can
“undo the effects of past discrimination” without classifying by race.11  As to
state contracting, the state may adopt a preference for small or new busi-
nesses.  Scalia agreed with the Court “that a fundamental distinction must be
4 Id. at 477 (majority opinion).
5 Id. at 480.
6 Id. at 506.
7 Id. at 505.
8 Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 521 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
10 Id. (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 526 (citation omitted).  Scalia maintained that “there is only one circumstance
in which the States may act by race to ‘undo the effects of past discrimination’: where that is
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification.”
Id. at 524.  Scalia used this principle to explain the school desegregation cases in which the
Court had sometimes held that states are obligated to employ race-conscious remedies. Id.
He sought, however, to cabin this exception, claiming that “outside the context of school
assignment,” the Court had been unwilling to conclude “that the continuing effects of
prior discrimination can be equated with state maintenance of a discriminatory system.”
Id. at 525.  Scalia’s language here cabining the principle suggests that he did not believe
these precedents reflected the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, but that
he was following them based on stare decisis.
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drawn between the effects of ‘societal’ discrimination and the effects of ‘iden-
tified’ discrimination.”12  Laws that are tailored to provide contracts to those
who have been identified as having previously been discriminated against are
permissible not because it would “justify race-conscious action,” but because
“it would enable race-neutral remediation.”13  In a claim that will be relevant
to evaluating the congressional statutes passed during Reconstruction, Scalia
wrote:
Nothing prevents Richmond from according a contracting preference to
identified victims of discrimination.  While most of the beneficiaries might
be black, neither the beneficiaries nor those disadvantaged by the prefer-
ence would be identified on the basis of their race.  In other words, far from
justifying racial classification, identification of actual victims of discrimina-
tion makes it less supportable than ever, because more obviously
unneeded.14
Justice Scalia concluded the opinion by arguing that providing race-based
benefits to blacks will in the long run reinforce racial thinking, which will “be
the source of more injustice still.”15
Scalia’s opinion then had certain characteristics.  First, he adopted a pri-
marily colorblind position.  It was not entirely colorblind, since he was willing
to permit race-conscious action that addressed the continuing effects of past
discrimination as to school segregation.  But presumably Scalia’s position
here was based on precedent rather than a view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.16  Second, he implemented his notion of the colorblind Constitution
through a strict scrutiny approach.  While Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Croson also endorsed strict scrutiny, her version allowed more room for race-
conscious action.  Third, Justice Scalia engaged in little discussion of the con-
stitutional text and almost no discussion of the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.17  Finally, Scalia often made moral claims about the issues,
such as asserting that racial discrimination of any kind is unethical and that
affirmative action leads to greater harm in the future.18  While these claims
might possibly be understood as merely rhetorical or part of the analysis of
12 Id. at 526.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 526–27 (emphasis in original).
15 Id. at 527–28.
16 Justice Scalia also did not make crystal clear when he was applying his own views and
when he was following or making allowance for the Court’s precedents.  At times, one gets
the strong impression that he was following precedent, as with the school desegregation
cases, but it is not entirely clear.
17 Justice Scalia discussed the text and history most in reference to the Court’s applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government. See 488 U.S. at 521–22.
While he gave reasons why the federal government should have greater discretion as to
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, he did not address the most fundamental
issue—that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal government—pre-
sumably because this issue had been resolved to the contrary by the case of Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
18 488 U.S. at 521.
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whether the program satisfied strict scrutiny, when combined with the
absence of historical analysis, it can give rise to the inference that his position
was based on moral principles rather than originalist or strictly legal analysis.
B. Justice Thomas
In the main, Justice Thomas has very similar views on the constitutional-
ity of affirmative action to those of Justice Scalia.  Both articulate a color-
blindness principle that is implemented through strict scrutiny.  Despite
these similarities, Justice Thomas clearly writes with a different voice when
discussing affirmative action.
Justice Thomas’s views on the constitutionality of affirmative action are
contained mainly in his opinions in three cases: Grutter v. Bollinger,19 Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,20 and Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin.21  In Grutter, a majority of the Supreme Court
approved the affirmative action admissions plan operated by the University of
Michigan Law School.  Under the plan, the Law School did not restrict the
types of diversity eligible for substantial weight, recognizing that there are
many possible bases for diversity.22  The Law School believed that, by enroll-
ing a “‘critical mass’ of [underrepresented] minority students,” the school
could ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the school.23
The Supreme Court upheld the Law School’s admission’s plan.  In the
majority opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court first reaffirmed that
racial classifications are constitutional only if they satisfy strict scrutiny.24
The Court held that the Law School had a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body.25  In reaching that conclusion, the Court gave defer-
ence to the Law School’s academic decisions,26 assuming good faith on the
part of the Law School absent a showing to the contrary.27
Justice Thomas largely dissented from the Court’s holding.  In an opin-
ion joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that
“the Law School’s racial discrimination” should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny.28  Thomas argued “that only those measures the State must take to pro-
vide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute” a
19 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
22 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted).
23 Id. (alteration in original).
24 Id. at 326.
25 Id. at 328.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 329.
28 See id. at 350–51 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice
Thomas was also the only Justice to join Justice Scalia’s opinion.  Both Justices joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent.
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compelling government interest.29  Justice Thomas then wrote that “[t]he
Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those clas-
sifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but
also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us
all.”30
In the remainder of the opinion, Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s
analysis.  He argued that the Law School’s interest here was not really diver-
sity, but having an elite law school with a diverse student body.31  But this
interest was not compelling.  In fact, Thomas maintained that merely having
a public law school, whether elite or not, was not even a compelling interest,
especially one like the University of Michigan that educated mainly out-of-
state students.32  Thomas also objected to granting deference to a public uni-
versity accused of race discrimination, claiming it was both unprecedented
and inconsistent with strict scrutiny.33
In Seattle School District, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, held that a public school system that either had not operated
legally segregated schools or that had, but had been subsequently found to
have rectified the segregation, may not classify students by race in making
school assignments.34  The school districts had sought to use race in
assigning students to schools in an effort to increase racial balance.35  Rob-
erts’s opinion, parts of which secured majority support and parts of which
merely secured a plurality of four Justices, concluded that the school dis-
tricts’ assignment plans neither served a compelling state interest nor were
narrowly tailored to such an interest.36
Justice Thomas joined the entirety of the Chief Justice’s opinion.37
Thomas wrote a sole concurrence, however, to address arguments that Justice
Breyer had made in dissent.38  First, Justice Thomas drew a distinction
between segregation and racial balance.  According to Thomas, segregation
as to public schooling involves “the deliberate operation of a school system to
‘carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the
29 Id. at 353.  Thomas stated that the Court’s cases had previously found only two
circumstances where there was a compelling state interest to justify racial discrimination by
government actors: promoting national security and remedying past discrimination for
which the state was responsible. Id. at 351.  But Thomas appeared to reject the latter basis
from Croson. Id. at 353.
30 Id. at 353.
31 Id. at 355–56.
32 Id. at 358–59.
33 Id. at 362.
34 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48
(2007) (majority opinion).
35 Id. at 710.
36 Id. at 708–09, 726.
37 Id. at 709.
38 Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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basis of race.’”39  Racial imbalance is not segregation, since it can result from
a variety of other causes.40
Justice Thomas argued that school districts lack a present interest in
remedying past segregation.  “The Constitution generally prohibits govern-
ment race-based decisionmaking,”41 but
has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a
school district has a “history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single
school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to
separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.”42
Thus, Thomas appeared to accept the school desegregation cases as a legiti-
mate exception to the colorblindness rule.43
Justice Thomas rejected what he regarded as the dissent’s attempt to
weaken the requirements of strict scrutiny.44  He saw this weakening as a
“rejection of the colorblind Constitution.”45  Justice Thomas concluded by
repeating Justice Harlan’s statement from his dissent in Plessy that “[o]ur
Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.”46
In Fisher, the Supreme Court reviewed the admission process of the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School, which considered race as one of various factors
for admission.  Seven members of the Court joined an opinion that clarified
the Court’s holding in Grutter.  The Court made clear that strict scrutiny with-
out deference applies to reviewing the use of race as a means of pursuing
educational diversity.47  Justice Thomas joined the opinion’s clarification of
Grutter, but subject to the reservation that he continued to believe that Grutter
was mistaken.48
Like his other opinions, Justice Thomas’s concurrence argues for a col-
orblindness approach based on strict scrutiny, relying on constitutional inter-
pretation, precedent, and desirable consequences.49  The focus of this
opinion, however, is to show that the type of arguments used to justify affirm-
ative action had been used in the past to support discrimination against
minorities.50  Thomas attempts to demonstrate this by a review of the argu-
39 Id. at 749 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 6
(1971)).
40 Id. at 750.
41 Id. at 751.
42 Id. at 752 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 5–6 (1971)).
43 In this respect, Justice Thomas appeared to follow the same position as Justice
Scalia. See supra text accompanying note 17.
44 551 U.S. at 757–58.
45 Id. at 772.
46 Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
47 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (majority opinion).
48 Id. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 2422–34.
50 Id. at 2429.
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ments made to the Court in the school desegregation cases as well as the
defenses made for slavery and segregation.51
Thus, Justice Thomas’s opinions in Grutter, Seattle School District, and
Fisher share many of the characteristics of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Croson—
endorsing colorblindness and strict scrutiny, following a mix of constitutional
interpretation and precedent, and avoiding discussion of history while mak-
ing claims of political morality.  But in two places in these opinions—once in
Seattle School District and once in Fisher—Thomas did address issues relating to
the original meaning.  In Seattle School District, Thomas discussed in a foot-
note the claim that Congress during Reconstruction had passed race-based
laws that benefited blacks.52  Thomas discussed the issue in response to an
objection from Justice Breyer in his dissent.  Breyer cited to studies that
referred to federal funding under the Freedman’s Bureau of “race-conscious
school integration programs.”53  Justice Thomas responded that he had
no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to
bring former slaves into American society as full members. . . . What the
dissent fails to understand, however, is that the colorblind Constitution does
not bar the government from taking measures to remedy past state-spon-
sored discrimination—indeed, it requires that such measures be taken in
certain circumstances. . . . Race-based government measures during the
1860’s and 1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not inconsis-
tent with the colorblind Constitution.54
Thomas’s argument here is not entirely clear.  But he appears to be con-
tending that the Freedmen’s Bureau Laws did not discriminate based on race
because these laws provided benefits to victims of state oppression rather
than to blacks simply.  Under this interpretation, Thomas’s argument
accords with Justice Scalia’s view that the states can act to provide benefits to
blacks, not as blacks, but as the victims of prior discrimination.
While Thomas makes an important point about the Freedman’s Bureau
Laws, it is insufficient to provide an originalist defense of his position on
affirmative action.  There are additional laws relied upon by critics of the
colorblindness position that Thomas’s defense does not explain.  Nor does
Thomas provide an original meaning argument based on the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In his Fisher concurrence, Justice Thomas also discusses a case that is
relevant to the original meaning.  Justice Thomas notes that in the 1868 case
of Clark v. Board of Directors,55 the Iowa Supreme Court held that an Iowa
school’s refusal to admit a black student on the ground that public sentiment
opposed integrated schools violated the state constitution.56  While Justice
51 Id. at 2429–32.
52 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 n.19
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 772 n.19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
56 Id. at 276.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-NOV-13 14:33
2013] originalism  and  the  colorblind  constitution 81
Thomas raised the case to show that the idea of colorblindness was not
“new[,]”57 he did not make any serious effort to argue that it was the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For example, Justice Thomas did
not discuss any other cases, nor did he note that the decision was decided on
state law grounds.  Although the decision might be an important part of a
showing that colorblindness had been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, it would only be a small part of such a showing, which would
require extensive argument.
Overall, then, Justice Thomas, like Justice Scalia, has not made a serious
effort to show that the colorblindness approach is consistent with the original
meaning.  Still, these two references show that Justice Thomas has at least
addressed the issue.58
II. THE CRITICS OF ORIGINALIST COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
The legal literature has for some time now reached two conclusions
regarding originalism, affirmative action, and the originalist Supreme Court
Justices.  First, the literature has concluded that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows affirmative action, at least for blacks and per-
haps for minorities and women generally.  Second, the literature has implied
and in some cases clearly charged that that the two principal originalists on
the Supreme Court have behaved hypocritically as to affirmative action.
These Justices have embraced a color blindness approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment and affirmative action, but they should have approved of affirm-
ative action based on the historical evidence.
These criticisms have been made by a variety of constitutional commen-
tators, including some of the leading constitutional scholars in the academy.
In Radicals in Robes, Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein devotes a chapter
largely to originalism and affirmative action, vigorously making both
points.59  First, Sunstein writes that the history surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment “cuts hard against” the originalists, who he refers to as the fun-
damentalists.60  Sunstein continues that the originalists’ view
strongly suggests that affirmative action policies were originally regarded as
legitimate.  Hence there is no historical warrant for the fundamentalist view
that affirmative action is generally unconstitutional.  On the contrary, history
supports affirmative action.  In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress
enacted programs that provided particular assistance to African-Americans,
and this makes it extremely difficult to attack affirmative action on funda-
mentalist grounds.61
57 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring).
58 The commentators, who have criticized Thomas for not addressing this issue, did so
prior to Seattle School District and Fisher and therefore were correct that Thomas had not
addressed the issue as of the time they wrote.  See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
59 CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 131 (2005).
60 Id. at 138.
61 Id.
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  In making this argument, Sunstein relies on the work of Eric Schnapper,
which is discussed below.62  He references the two Freedman’s Bureau Acts
as well as a law that provided special procedures for paying African American
soldiers on the ground that such soldiers were being victimized.63  Sunstein
reiterates this conclusion at several points, writing that the “central point is
that by invoking an ideal of color-blindness, fundamentalists are making up a
principle, not following the original understanding.”64
Second, Sunstein argues that the originalist Justices have not lived up to
their own principles.  They
have abandoned their own favorite principles of interpretation.  Astonish-
ingly, the Court’s most enthusiastic fundamentalists, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, have voted to strike down affirmative action programs without
devoting so much as a sentence to the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause.  Both justices usually pay a great deal of attention to his-
tory, particularly when they are voting to invalidate the actions of other
branches of government.  But on affirmative action their judgments do not
depend on history at all.  They don’t seem to care about it.65
Elsewhere in the chapter Sunstein writes: “What is most remarkable is that
fundamentalists have voted to strike down affirmative action programs with-
out producing a hint of a reason to think that such programs are inconsistent
with the original understanding of the ratifiers.”66
Sunstein concludes: “I have shown that with respect to affirmative action,
the fundamentalist position is arrogant, hypocritical, and extremely hard to
defend.  Fundamentalists ought to approve of affirmative action as a matter
of constitutional law, even if they disapprove of it as a matter of principle and
politics.”67
In another important article in The Yale Law Journal, Yale Law Professor
Jed Rubenfeld relies on different evidence to reach much the same conclu-
sions.68  First, Rubenfeld attempts to show that colorblindness is not the orig-
inal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment based on his discussion of a
variety of federal laws that provided benefits to blacks.  Unlike the Freed-
men’s Bureau Acts relied upon by Sunstein, which did not generally provide
benefits to blacks as such but instead to former slaves and refugees, the laws
discussed by Rubenfeld are explicitly race-conscious laws, such as laws provid-
ing benefits to destitute colored persons.69  Rubenfeld writes that “while the
Freedmen’s Bureau Acts were arguably race-neutral, the statutes referred to
in the text above were not.”70
62 Id. at 259 n.5.
63 Id. at 139–40.
64 Id. at 141.
65 Id. at 133–34.
66 Id. at 140.
67 Id. at 148.
68 Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997).
69 Id. at 430–31.
70 Id. at 431 n.23.
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Rubenfeld concludes that these statutes show that advocates of following
the original understanding cannot be in favor of a colorblind interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He writes:
What do [these statutes] prove?  Only that those who profess fealty to the
“original understanding,” who abhor judicial “activism,” or who hold that
the legal practices at the time of enactment “say what they say” and dictate
future interpretation, cannot categorically condemn color-based distribution
of governmental benefits as they do.71
Second, Rubenfeld emphasizes what he regards as the inconsistency of
the originalist Justices.  He writes:
[T]o be true to their principles, two of the five Justices in the prevailing anti-
affirmative action majority—Justices Scalia and Thomas, whose commitment
to original understandings and practices is also a matter of record—should
drop their categorical opposition to race-based affirmative action
measures.72
And later Rubenfeld elaborates:
I am no originalist, so I cannot regard the practices of Congress in the 1860s
as dispositive of affirmative action’s constitutionality. . . .  [T]he point is not
to foreclose argument by citing old statutes.  It is to begin the argument with
a little more candor.  The colorblind contingent must begin by recognizing
that they are calling on courts to render the kind of judgment about justice
(beyond the letter of the law, beyond original intent) that elsewhere they
deplore.73
Finally, Eric Schnapper, who wrote one of the earliest articles on the
subject and on whom Sunstein relies, also argues that the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment allows laws that benefit blacks.74  He begins
his article:
This article contends that the legislative history of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment is not only relevant to but dispositive of the legal dispute over
the constitutional standards applicable to race-conscious affirmative action
plans.  From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Recon-
struction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare
programs whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks.  These programs
were generally open to all blacks, not only to recently freed slaves, and were
adopted over repeatedly expressed objections that such racially exclusive
measures were unfair to whites.  The race-conscious Reconstruction pro-
grams were enacted concurrently with the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and
were supported by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guar-
antee of equal protection.  This history strongly suggests that the framers of
71 Id. at 431–32 (footnote omitted).
72 Id. at 427.
73 Id. at 432.
74 Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985).
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the [A]mendment could not have intended it generally to prohibit affirma-
tive action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.75
While these three pieces have received a great deal of attention, they are
hardly the only articles that have made these claims.  Similar claims of one or
the other type have been made by other leading scholars, such as Jack Balkin,
Robert Post, and Reva Siegel.76
While the critics argue that the originalist evidence cuts against the col-
orblind Constitution, what view of the Fourteenth Amendment do they
believe this evidence supports?  Although the critics’ views may differ a bit
and are at times vague, in the main, they appear to believe that the originalist
evidence supports what might be termed an antisubordination or group-
based approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.  As developed by Sunstein,
Schnapper, and Balkin, the critics adopt something like the following
approach.77  Programs, such as affirmative action, that are designed to pro-
vide benefits to groups that are historically disadvantaged should be pre-
75 Id. at 754 (footnote omitted).  Given Schnapper’s view about the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would appear that he would regard originalists who do
not follow that original meaning as hypocritical.  But Schnapper does not appear to make
the charge of hypocrisy.  Instead, he argues like a moderate originalist, writing that the
historical intent behind the various provisions of the Constitution is often
obscure, but where it is clear that intent must be faithfully implemented by the
judiciary.  In such situation, the Constitution accords to the Supreme Court no
mandate to develop a new theory of its own, or to reconsider arguments first
bruited and rejected over a century ago. . . . The interpretation of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment’s limitations on affirmative action should turn . . .
not on whether a majority of the present Supreme Court would have opted for
these race-conscious Reconstruction programs, but on the fact that the [T]hirty-
[N]inth Congress repeatedly chose to do so.
See id. at 798.
76 Relying on much the same evidence, Balkin concludes that the federal laws passed
during Reconstruction help to establish that affirmative action is constitutional.  He writes:
Current law treats [affirmative action] the same way it treats Jim Crow laws. . . .
The ideas of caste and class legislation can offer a useful corrective. Policies that
seek to integrate citizens from diverse backgrounds and ensure that important
educational and employment opportunities are open to all groups in society do
not subordinate majority groups or treat them as less worthy citizens.  Nor do they
make blacks or Latinos into a favored caste.  Quite the contrary: these programs
are necessary to the extent that minority groups still enjoy less status and less
equality of opportunity in American society.  As noted previously, the Reconstruc-
tion Congress passed race-conscious laws that granted educational benefits to
blacks, whether or not they themselves had formerly been held in slavery.  These
laws made racial classifications, but they did not subordinate or oppress whites or
make them into second-class citizens.
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 234–35 (2011).  Dean Robert Post and Professor Reva
Siegel reach the same conclusions. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 564 (2006).
77 Jed Rubenfeld, in contrast to the other critics, does not appear to argue for an
originalist view of the Fourteenth Amendment other than to claim that the Amendment
does not support a colorblindness approach. See Rubenfeld, supra note 68, at 429–32.
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sumptively deemed constitutional whereas benefits to groups that are not
subordinate should be treated with strong skepticism.78  Affirmative action
programs should be reviewed mainly to make sure that they operate to help
promote the real interests of subordinate groups and to diffuse the costs to
individual members of nonsubordinate groups.79
Under this approach, there is a different standard of review for laws that
benefit blacks and other subordinate groups than for laws that benefit non-
subordinate groups.  Moreover, the approach focuses primarily on group
membership rather than individual treatment.  For example, the approach
does not require that disadvantaged individuals in the nonsubordinate group
receive similar benefits to those in the subordinate group.  Nor does it pro-
hibit advantaged individuals in the subordinate group from receiving these
benefits.  These latter requirements are not needed under an approach that
focuses on group status rather than individual treatment.
III. THE FEDERAL LAWS PASSED AT THE TIME OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In exploring whether the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits all race discrimination, the best evidence would come from
that of word meanings and the purpose of the Amendment.  Theories of this
kind, which are generally regarded as providing the strongest evidence of the
original meaning, are discussed in Part IV.
The critics of the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, focus
upon a different type of originalist evidence: they discuss various federal stat-
utes that were passed near the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted.  Because the critics believe that Congress at the time passed many
laws that selectively benefited blacks, they argue that a colorblindness inter-
pretation of the Constitution that would have conflicted with those statutes
cannot be correct.
This Part examines this historical evidence and considers its implica-
tions.  This evidence consists largely of seven sets of laws passed by the gov-
ernment, which fall into two categories.  First, there were two Freedmen’s
Bureau Acts that provided various benefits to former slaves and refugees.
Second, Congress passed a number of mainly spending provisions that pro-
vided benefits to black people.  The analysis of these laws differs.  The Freed-
men’s Bureau Laws explicitly provide benefits to former slaves, not to blacks.
Thus, the critics must argue that these laws nonetheless provide race-based
benefits.  The other category of laws does appear to explicitly provide bene-
fits to blacks.  Here the critics must argue that, upon examination, these ben-
efits are actually race-based.
In this Part, I first put aside the issue of whether these laws provide race-
based benefits and examine whether these federal laws inform the meaning
78 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 149–50; BALKIN, supra 76, at 234–35; Schnapper,
supra note 74, at 798.
79 Balkin, supra note 76, at 234–35.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.  I contend that there is very little reason to
believe that they do.  The basic argument is that the Congress that passed
these laws understood that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the
federal government and, therefore, we cannot assume that Congress was con-
forming its laws to the Amendment.  In fact, the federal government was pur-
posefully excluded from the Amendment and there are good reasons for
believing that the Congress was taking advantage of the flexibility that the
Amendment allowed it to pursue public policy in the various circumstances
confronting it at the time.
Having concluded that these laws do not significantly inform the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment, I then examine whether these laws actu-
ally provided race-based benefits to blacks.  I argue that there is no strong
evidence for concluding that six of these seven laws confer race-based bene-
fits.  The two most important of these laws—the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts—
did not provide such benefits, but instead conferred non-race-based benefits
to victims of slavery.  Moreover, four of the five other laws that do explicitly
refer to blacks do not, upon closer examination, constitute strong evidence
of race-based laws—either because they are not best interpreted as providing
benefits to blacks on racial grounds or because they can be reasonably inter-
preted as providing non-race-based benefits.  The fifth of the other laws, how-
ever, does appear to provide race-based benefits, at least under one of the
versions of strict scrutiny employed by the originalist Justices, but may do so
on considerably narrower grounds than the critics suggest.
I then consider a set of laws largely ignored by the critics: federal laws
passed at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment that harmed minorities.  I
argue that the critics would have a hard time with these laws.  If the laws that
benefit blacks inform the meaning of the Amendment, then so should these
laws.  But if both sets of laws inform the meaning of the Amendment, then it
would have a peculiar meaning.  It would seem to allow a large variety of laws
that can either harm or benefit blacks and other minorities.  One might won-
der where the equality principle in the Fourteenth Amendment is.  Instead, it
is far better to conclude that these laws were passed by a Congress that did
not consider itself bound by the Amendment.
Overall, then, I conclude that the laws passed by the federal government
do not support the arguments of the critics.  These laws neither inform the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment nor do they, with one exception,
represent significant evidence of race-based laws that selectively benefited
blacks.
A. Do the Laws Benefiting Blacks Inform the Meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
One might wonder why laws that are passed by the federal government
would be a good indication of the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment provi-
sions that do not apply to the federal government.  The critics of Justices
Scalia and Thomas might respond that these laws were passed by the same
Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment (or by Congresses near in
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time to its passage).  The critics therefore might claim that these laws
represent the values that Congress placed into the Amendment.
I argue here, however, that the claim that these laws inform the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment is actually quite weak.  To explore the
strength of the evidence provided by these laws, I first discuss a hypothetical
alternative version of the Fourteenth Amendment that applies its equality
rule directly to the federal government.  If such an amendment existed, there
would have been a much stronger argument that these federal laws inform
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by no means one as strong
as that claimed by the critics.  I then examine the actual Fourteenth Amend-
ment and show that there are very strong reasons why the Congresses that
passed these federal laws should not be understood as having been interpret-
ing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment or conforming these laws to
the Amendment.  Thus, one cannot infer that these federal laws reflected
Congress’s view of the meaning of the Amendment.
1. The Best Case for the Critics: An Alternative Fourteenth Amendment
In assessing the strength of the evidence provided by these federal stat-
utes, it is useful to imagine an alternative version of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Under this version, the Amendment applies the equality rule—either
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection
Clause—to the federal government.  In fact, there were earlier versions of the
Amendment that actually did this, including a version proposed by Thaddeus
Stevens.80  These proposed amendments, however, were rejected by the Con-
gress.  Under an amendment that applied to the federal government, the
case for viewing these federal statutes as informing the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment is much stronger.  Yet, even then, it is of limited force.
If the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the federal government, then
the Congress that passed this legislation would have been bound by the
Amendment.  One might then infer that that Congress would have inter-
preted the Constitution and concluded that this legislation was consistent
with the meaning of the Amendment.  This type of argument is often made
as, for example, when the legislation passed by the First Congress is said to
inform the meaning of the original Constitution.81
If the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the federal government, then
this federal legislation would have been considerably stronger evidence of
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but even then it would have
been of limited force.  These statutes would, at most, be evidence of the inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the Congress at the time that the Fourteenth
Amendment was proposed.  While that evidence would certainly be relevant,
it would not normally be thought by most contemporary originalists as being
80 Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 276 (1997) (discussing proposals, including Stevens’s, that would have applied an
equality requirement to the federal government).
81 Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790–91 (1983).
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dispositive.  Instead, the proper meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
would turn on what a reasonable and informed person at the time would
have concluded that the words meant in context.  Congressional interpreta-
tions of the Constitution would be evidence of what such a reasonable person
would have concluded, but would not automatically indicate the meaning of
the provision.
To explore the strength of the evidence that these statutes might pro-
vide, it is useful to compare the various types of evidence that statutory enact-
ments can provide.  First, the strongest evidence would exist if the Congress
that enacted these statutes offered a constitutional interpretation to justify its
decision.  Suppose that many members of Congress had determined that the
statutes provided race-based benefits to blacks and that such statutes were
consistent with the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Sup-
pose further that these members had articulated and adopted an interpreta-
tion of the language of the Amendment that yielded that result.  Finally,
suppose that this interpretation showed substantial care and effort.  Under
those circumstances, this interpretation would be entitled to significant
respect.  An interpretation adopted by people at the time, who were knowl-
edgeable about the meaning of a provision, would be important evidence of
its meaning.
Yet, even this interpretation would hardly be dispositive.  An interpreta-
tion of this sort would not necessarily be what a reasonable interpreter of the
constitutional language would reach.  The congressional interpreters might
simply be mistaken about their constitutional interpretation.  Moreover, this
interpretation might be entitled to less weight and, therefore, be more likely
to be mistaken if there were other interpretations offered at the time, either
in the Congress or elsewhere.  Finally, the Congress that passed the legisla-
tion might have been interpreting the Constitution strategically.  It is well
known that a constitutional provision that was said to mean one thing at the
time it was being debated, might then be treated as having a different mean-
ing after it was enacted.  Thus, one might often be skeptical that the later
interpretation was correct.  This is especially the case if the meaning
embraced by the later interpretation might not have been enacted because of
the supermajority requirements for passing a constitutional provision.
At the opposite extreme is the weakest type of evidence from legisla-
tion—legislation that is passed without any discussion of the constitutional
issues.  In this situation, the Congress might be silent about the legislation or
might address policy matters, but does not discuss the meaning of the Consti-
tution.  This type of evidence is very weak.  It will, of course, have the
problems discussed above (such as possibly being mistaken or having been
enacted for strategic reasons).  But it will have much more serious problems.
First, this evidence will not indicate what interpretation of the Constitution
the Congress employed.  All that Congress did was pass a particular law.  That
law might be constitutional under a number of different interpretations.  For
example, legislation that provides race-based benefits might be justified
under either a narrow or broad exception to a colorblindness interpretation.
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Second, not knowing the actual constitutional interpretation is also problem-
atic because it prevents us from assessing how strong the interpretation is.
Third, because there are also no arguments for the interpretation, it is diffi-
cult to determine how strong the support offered for the interpretation was.
Fourth, because the interpretation is not supplied, it is also difficult to deter-
mine whether the Congress thought about the issue seriously or failed to
consider it at all.  Finally, it will also be impossible to determine how many
members of Congress actually held or voiced a particular interpretation.
Thus, this evidence is extremely weak.  All we know is that Congress
passed a particular law, but we do not know whether it considered the Consti-
tution, and, if it did so, how carefully it did so, what its interpretation was,
and how strong its arguments for that interpretation were.  Overall, then,
naked legislation of this type, without the clothing of an explicit constitu-
tional interpretation, tells us very little about what the constitutional interpre-
tation was and how much weight we should give to it.
The weakness of such naked interpretations is particularly important for
our consideration in the next section of the legislation that the critics have
argued supports the constitutionality of race-based benefits for blacks.  As we
will see, that legislation falls into the naked category.  In some cases, the legis-
lative history is silent about the legislation.  In other cases, there is some dis-
cussion, but it does not involve the Constitution.  Instead, it either discusses
policy or political morality, such as whether it is appropriate to provide bene-
fits to blacks rather than to all persons.82
2. Reasons for Exempting the Federal Government: The Jurisdictional
Theory
While these statutes would inform the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a limited way if the Amendment applied to the federal gov-
ernment, it, of course, does not.  The exclusion of the federal government
from the equality rule of the Amendment disrupts all the more the connec-
tion between the federal legislation and the Amendment.  In fact, given that
the Amendment does not apply to the federal government, one might won-
der why this federal legislation is even considered relevant to the Amend-
ment’s meaning.  The answer given most often is that Congress proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it would have been unlikely to violate the
Amendment’s provisions in passing legislation, even if the Amendment did
not technically apply to the federal government.  The assumption here is that
members of Congress had a single principle that they believed in and they
82 While this latter question might be thought to be linked to the Equal Protection
Clause, that cannot be assumed.  The question is what principle the Fourteenth Amend-
ment adopted.  One cannot assume that this discussion was applying the Fourteenth
Amendment principle when, as we will see, there are reasons why other principles might
be applied, when the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the federal government,
and when the legislators did not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment.
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thought that principle should govern action by both the states and the fed-
eral government.
While this argument appeals to many people, it runs into problems
immediately.  If Congress had an equality principle that it believed should
regulate all governments, including the federal government, then why did it
not apply that principle to the federal government in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, especially when draft amendments had been proposed that would have
done exactly that?  As this question suggests, a fundamental feature of any
approach to understanding the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal leg-
islation at that time is to explain why the Amendment was not applied to the
federal government.  Once that is explained, then one can inquire as to
whether the federal statutes are likely to be informative of the meaning of the
Amendment.
The most straightforward and convincing explanation for the failure to
apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government is what might
be called the jurisdictional theory.  Under this theory, one does not ask
whether people believed simply in applying a principle to the government.
Rather, the question is whether they believed in applying a principle to a
particular level of government—either the federal government or the states.
According to the jurisdictional theory of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Congress that proposed the Amendment thought that an equality princi-
ple should be applied to the states but not to the federal government.  The
enactors of the Amendment had good reason to believe that the states should
be strictly limited by a clear provision from passing laws that discriminated on
the basis of race.  The Black Codes were a clear example of what the former
Confederate states might do if they were allowed to act freely.  Thus, to pre-
vent the states from oppressing blacks and from passing other types of class
legislation, Congress applied an equality principle to the states.83
By contrast, the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment might have rea-
sonably believed that such a legal provision was not needed against the fed-
eral government.  The federal government had shown itself to be a much
better protector of the rights of minorities than had the states.  In fact, con-
gressional Republicans saw the Congress and the Union Army as part of the
solution to the attacks on the rights of blacks, not as something to be feared.
Thus, they might have thought it unnecessary to impose a limit on the fed-
eral government.
This jurisdictional approach to constitutional provisions was hardly an
innovation within the American tradition.  The Bill of Rights was based on a
different version of the jurisdictional theory.  The Antifederalists, who were
the principal proponents of the Bill, believed that the federal government
83 Class legislation was a term used at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment “to refer
to legislation that ‘single[s] out one class and confer[s] upon them a consequence which
[it does] not confer upon another class.’” See Saunders, supra note 80, at 289 n.198 (alter-
ation in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 79 (1867) (statement of
Sen. Grimes (R-Iowa)).  Such legislation was deemed to be problematic.  The Black Codes
were the paradigmatic example of class legislation.
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posed a substantial danger to the people’s liberties because it was a central
and distant power.  They therefore supported significant restrictions on the
federal government.  None of the provisions were applied against the
states.84  In fact, when Madison sought to apply a couple of rights against the
states, the Senate deleted them.  The reverse jurisdictional theory—applying
restrictions to the states, but not to the federal government—appealed to the
enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment.85
These jurisdictional theories may seem alien to modern American con-
stitutional lawyers.  In Bolling v. Sharpe,86 the Supreme Court wrote that it
would be “unthinkable” for the Constitution to prohibit the states from oper-
ating segregated schools but to permit the federal government to do so.87
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that virtually the entire Bill of Rights,
which originally applied only against the federal government, now applies
against the states.  Thus, it is natural for modern constitutional lawyers to
assume that a provision that was applied against one level of government
should apply against another one.  But this natural reaction for modern law-
yers should be understood to be anachronistic when applied to the period
when the Amendment was enacted.  At that time, there was nothing strange
about applying a principle to one level of government but not to another.
While there is a strong case for the basic outlines of the jurisdictional
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, that theory still requires further devel-
opment.  One basic question is, if people at the time accepted the jurisdic-
tional theory, then how did they expect or desire the federal government to
behave?  One possibility is that they exempted the federal government from
the Fourteenth Amendment because they wanted to allow the federal govern-
ment to pass class laws and to be able to discriminate based on race.
But this possibility seems quite unlikely.  If one examines the discussions
of the federal legislation that was enacted at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the evidence suggests that legislators opposed enacting laws
that discriminated for no good reason.  Thus, there is a strong argument that
the legislators at the time believed that the federal government should con-
form to certain norms of behavior.  If so, then the question remains why they
did not restrain the federal government based on those norms.  The best
answer appears to be that they believed that it would be better to allow the
federal government to act based on a legally unenforceable equality norm—a
84 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).  Some state constitutions
already protected some of the rights in the Bill as a matter of state law, but citizens in many
states were not constitutionally protected as to some or all of these rights.
85 The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment may have applied the Bill of Rights to the
states does not undermine these jurisdictional theories.  By the time of Reconstruction, the
Republicans no longer believed that the federal government was the principal danger.
Rather, they believed that the states were the problem and therefore may have supported
applying the Bill to the states.
86 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87 Id. at 500.
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norm of political morality rather than law—than to subject it to a single
legally enforceable equality requirement.
There are at least two reasons why they might have believed it was better
to subject the federal government merely to a norm of political morality.
First, there might have been significant disagreement about the content of
the equality principle.  One group might have favored one version of the
principle, another group a different version, and a third group yet another
version.  For example, one group might have believed separate but equal was
adequate, whereas a different group believed that no racial distinctions were
justified.  One group might have believed that special benefits for blacks as
an oppressed group was justified whereas a different group might have
opposed such benefits as a special privilege.  One group might have believed
the equality principle should extend only to civil rights, whereas another
might have believed it should extend to all laws.
If people disagreed about the correct equality principle, then they might
not have wanted to enact a single principle into the Constitution, or they
might not have had sufficient support to do so.  Instead, they might have
believed it was better to leave the Constitution silent on this issue, thereby
allowing the Congress to decide on a case-by-case basis which conception of
equality to follow.
Of course, the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment did choose a sin-
gle conception of equality to apply to the states.  But here there is a ready
explanation for why they drew a distinction between the states and the fed-
eral government.  Given the history of the two levels of government, the
enactors might have reasonably believed that the states could not be trusted
to choose a reasonable equality conception whereas the federal government
could be.  Put differently, the benefits of constitutionalizing a single equality
conception (in terms of preventing oppression) outweighed the benefits of
not doing so (in terms of flexibility to accommodate different conceptions)
at the state level, but not at the federal level.
The second reason why the enactors might have believed it was better to
subject the federal government only to a norm of political morality was the
belief that the appropriate norm was too complicated to communicate in a
brief constitutional provision.  For example, it might have been thought that
a rule of no racial distinctions should exist for basic rights, whereas a princi-
ple of separate but equal should exist for important, but less basic rights, and
a more lenient restriction should exist for other matters.  Or it might have
been thought that the appropriate rule would depend on the circumstances,
so that segregation might be justified under certain circumstances, but not
others.  This reason differs from the first one.  Under the first reason, people
disagree as to the appropriate rule.  Under the second reason, everyone
might agree on the appropriate rule, but it is simply too complicated to com-
municate to the judiciary.
Once again, this reason would explain why an equality norm was not
applied to the federal government.  It would simply have been too difficult to
communicate it in a way that would be likely to be understood.  Instead, it
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would have made sense to allow the Congress, which had shown itself to be
trustworthy, to make the decisions on a statute-by-statute basis.  Of course,
the enactors did impose an equality limitation on the states.  But that limita-
tion was needed because the states could not be trusted to treat all groups
fairly.  Therefore, the Congress was willing to propose for the states either a
simpler norm or to incur the risk that the courts would mistakenly interpret
the norm.  In this case, the benefits of constitutionalizing a single equality
conception (in terms of preventing oppression) outweighed the benefits of
not doing so (in terms of allowing the legislature to apply the complicated
equality norm itself) at the state level, but not at the federal level.
In fact, both of these reasons might have applied at the same time.
There might have been disagreement about the appropriate norm (first rea-
son) and one or more of the differing groups might have believed that the
norm they favored was too complicated to be communicated (second
reason).
Under this understanding of the jurisdictional theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal statutes passed by Congress would not provide
much information about the meaning of the Amendment.  First, the Con-
gress that passed the Amendment would have known that it was not con-
strained by the Amendment and, therefore, would not have felt bound to
conform its legislation to it.  Second, while the debates over this legislation
might discuss issues such as whether the legislation was class legislation or
discriminatory, this discussion would not have been about the constitutional-
ity of the legislation, but instead would have involved issues of political moral-
ity.88  Thus, there would be little reason to conclude that the federal
legislation reflected Congress’s views on the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.89
88 A review of the debates indicates this is the case.  While there are sometime debates
over this legislation, it involves questions of discrimination and class legislation, but not
claims that the legislation is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Cf. Paul Moreno, Racial Classifications and Recon-
struction Legislation, 61 J. S. HIST. 271, 276 (1995) (detailing how debates regarding the
Freedmen’s Bureau Acts primarily involved questions of class legislation rather than
constitutionality).
89 In recent years, some scholars have argued that a Fourteenth Amendment equality
principle applies against the federal government. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, Originalism
and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493 (2013).  The main argument appears
to be that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States,”
confers the basic rights of citizens, including not being subject to arbitrary discrimination,
against both the federal government and the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  While
this is not the place to attempt to rebut this argument, a few words may be in order.
First, it would be extremely odd to read the Fourteenth Amendment in this way.  The
obvious meaning of the Amendment is that it confers citizenship rights in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, which stated that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.  If the Amendment had been intended to protect the privileges or immunities of
citizenship against the federal government, it could have easily used the language “[n]o
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3. Alternative Theories
Given the strength of the jurisdictional understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Congress’s statutes, the question is whether there is any
argument that the federal statutes significantly inform the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  To infer such evidence, one would have to explain
why the Framers excluded the federal government from the Fourteenth
Amendment restrictions, but still believed its principles applied to the federal
government.
One possible explanation again derives from the view that Congress did
not apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government because it
believed that this was unnecessary given the federal government’s good
behavior.  According to this explanation, a constitutional amendment is only
justified by a strong necessity and the federal government had not shown it
needed restricting.  But at the same time, Congress believed that federal leg-
islation should conform to the same principles of legislation that the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporated.  This explanation, then, differs from the
jurisdictional theory on the ground that it argues that the Congress believed
that the federal legislation should conform to the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though it consciously chose not to apply the Amendment to the federal
government.
While this explanation could theoretically account for Congress’s
actions, it suffers from significant weaknesses.  First, it seems implausible to
argue that Congress would have decided not to apply the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s equality limitation to the federal government, even though it
regarded that limitation as being an entirely appropriate for the federal gov-
ernment, simply on the ground that the federal government had not
behaved badly in recent years.  The Congress knew that the federal govern-
State nor the federal government,” as the Fifteenth Amendment would shortly do.  Instead,
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment makes perfect sense.  The first sentence of
the Amendment, the Citizenship Clause, indicates who is a citizen (persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States); the second sentence, in the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
indicates what their rights are (no state may abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens).
Second, the historical context for the Fourteenth Amendment is also informative.
The Thirteenth Amendment, which had prohibited slavery, had failed to provide a firm
foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  While some Republicans had argued that not
being a slave meant possessing basic civil rights, others argued that slavery referred to a
specific institution and that one could be free of the bondage of chattel slavery without
enjoying basic civil rights.  One reason to pass the Fourteenth Amendment was to place the
Civil Rights Act on a secure constitutional footing in a way that the Thirteenth Amendment
had failed to do.  But to rely on an inference that the mere status of citizenship conferred
basic civil rights was similar to relying on the inference that the absence of slavery con-
ferred such rights.  Such reliance on an unclear inference would have committed the same
error that the enactors of the Thirteenth Amendment had, in an amendment intended to
correct that error.  It makes much more sense to see the Fourteenth Amendment enactors
as spelling out the rights of citizens—protecting against states abridging their privileges or
immunities.
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ment might eventually come under the control of the Democrats, who might
pass oppressive legislation.  Moreover, the mere fact that Congress had not
recently behaved badly was not a strong reason for not extending the Amend-
ment to the federal government, because the opportunity to pass a constitu-
tional amendment on a subject does not come around all that often.  The
opportunity was available at this time since the subject of nondiscrimination
was being discussed and a version of the amendment that would have cov-
ered the federal government had been proposed.90
This explanation for not applying the Amendment to the federal govern-
ment contrasts with the explanation based on the jurisdictional theory.
Under the jurisdictional theory, there were much stronger reasons not to
extend a limitation on the states to the federal government—Congress either
could not agree on a single standard or believed it was too complicated to
enact in a brief provision.  But under this alternative theory, there was no
strong reason not to extend the limitation to the federal government since
the Congress believed the Fourteenth Amendment contained the appropri-
ate standard for the federal government.
Second, even if one assumes that Congress chose not to extend the
Amendment to the federal government solely because the federal govern-
ment had behaved well in recent years, that does not mean that the federal
statutes that were enacted reflected the Congress’s view of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Once Congress had decided not to apply the Amendment to
the federal government, it is not clear that it would have felt constrained by
that Amendment.  It is not uncommon for people, who are willing to apply a
standard to themselves but did not do so, to depart from that standard in the
future when dealing with a specific situation.91
90 See Saunders, supra note 80, at 278.
91 The difficulty of finding an argument that allows these federal statutes to inform the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment remains even if one assumes, as I express skepti-
cism about in the next section, that the federal statutes were intended to provide race-
based benefits to blacks.  Suppose that Congress actually had the intent that the critics
allege that they had.  Suppose that Congress believed that government should not discrimi-
nate against blacks, but that it should be free to take actions to benefit blacks because of
their subordinate condition.  Under those circumstances, it is hard for the critics to
explain why the Amendment did not extend to the federal government.
Before explaining why, it is important to note that advocates of a colorblind interpre-
tation of the state equality requirement, who also believed that Congress intended to freely
benefit blacks in these federal statutes, could account for why Congress did not apply the
Amendment to the federal government.  The reason would be that Congress intended to
benefit blacks through federal legislation and applying an amendment that had a color-
blind requirement to the federal government would prohibit such legislation.
By contrast, the critics cannot use a similar account to explain the failure to extend
the Amendment to the federal government.  After all, if the critics were right that the
Amendment allows state laws that benefit blacks and that Congress intended to benefit
blacks when it passed federal legislation, then there would have been no reason to exclude
the federal government from the Amendment’s coverage.  The Amendment would have
allowed the federal legislation that benefited blacks even if it applied to the federal
government.
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To conclude, then, the argument that the federal legislation passed at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment significantly informs its meaning
appears weak.  First, even if one believed these statutes were intended to
reflect the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would at best be
naked legislation that does not indicate how Congress interpreted the Consti-
tution, how it reached that interpretation, how strong its reasons were, or
how much effort went into its determination.  Second, there are strong rea-
sons to doubt that this federal legislation was intended to conform to the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Under the jurisdictional theory,
the Congress purposefully chose not to extend the Amendment to the fed-
eral government.  Given this decision, it is difficult to conclude that it
believed federal legislation should necessarily conform to the Amendment.
B. Do These Laws Employ Racial Categories?
There is one additional reason why these federal statutes do not
represent significant evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment allows race-
based laws that benefit blacks: there is a strong argument that most and per-
haps virtually all of these statutes are not best understood as providing race-
based benefits to blacks.  I first consider the two Freedmen’s Bureau Acts and
then turn to the spending and other laws.
1. The Freedmen’s Bureau Acts
The Freedmen’s Bureau Acts were passed in 1865 and 1866.  The 1865
Act, passed while Abraham Lincoln was alive, mainly provided benefits to war
refugees and to freedman and their families.92  Section 2 of the Act author-
ized the issuance of “provisions, clothing, and fuel . . . needful for the imme-
diate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees
and freedmen and their wives and children.”93  Section 4 authorized the set-
ting “apart, for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen,” abandoned, confis-
cated, or purchased lands, and assigning “to every male citizen, whether
refugee or freedman . . . not more than forty acres of such land.”94  Thus, the
1865 Act provided food, clothing, and shelter to refugees and freedman, and
authorized the transfer of up to 40 acres of acquired land for the use of
refugees and freedman.
The 1866 Act significantly expanded upon the previous year’s statute.
This Act was initially vetoed by Andrew Johnson on a variety of grounds,95
but eventually a different version was passed and then enacted over John-
92 Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 507.
93 Id. at 508.
94 Id.
95 Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the Senate (Feb. 19, 1866), reprinted in 6 A COMPI-
LATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 398, 400 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1899).
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son’s veto.96  Section 2 expanded upon the prior Act’s assistance, allowing
for the Bureau’s supervision and care for all loyal refugees and freedmen.
While the assistance to freedmen and refugees in both acts have received
the most attention, other provisions in the 1866 Act are also important.  First,
some provisions in the Act either prohibit discriminatory laws or provide ben-
efits on a nondiscriminatory basis.  Section 14 sought to protect citizens
against racial discrimination in states where the rebellion had caused a dis-
continuance in ordinary government.97  It provided that the basic civil rights
of each citizen, in a list similar to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, shall be
secured “without respect to race or color . . . .”98  Section 8 called for funds
derived from the sale of land in Saint Helena to be used for the support of
schools “without distinction of color or race, . . . in the parishes of Saint
Helena and Saint Luke.”99  Finally, Section 12 is a mixture of providing edu-
cational benefits for freedmen and for promoting nondiscriminatory state
education.  It allowed for the disposal of Confederate state property for funds
to be used for “the education of the freed people,” but would provide these
funds to any Confederate state that would provide education “without distinc-
tion of color.”100
Finally, there are various provisions in the 1866 Act that relate to land
transfers or land occupation pursuant to prior acts either by General Sher-
man or by tax commissioners.  Sections 7, 9, and 11 involve land distributed
under General Sherman’s 1865 field order.101  Sherman’s order had set
aside various lands in the South for the settlement of blacks “made free by”
the Civil War.102  These provisions, therefore, provide benefits to former
slaves.
In addition, Section 6 of the Act allowed for the confirmation of certain
land sales made to heads of families of the African race by South Carolina tax
commissioners.103  This provision clearly refers to the race of these families
and in this respect might be thought of as race-based legislation.  But there
are two arguments that suggest that the Congress was not endorsing or taking
racial action.  First, because this transfer was made by the South Carolina tax
commissioners pursuant to Abraham Lincoln’s 1863 Executive Order, this
statute is merely confirming a prior act.104  When one confirms a prior act
that was legal at the time, one does not necessarily endorse the racial distinc-
tion drawn there.  One might simply be protecting a reliance interest.  Sec-
ond, while the transfer did refer to the race of the families, it is not clear that
96 Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173.
97 Id. at 176–77.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 175.
100 Id. at 176.
101 Id. at 175–76.
102 GENERAL SHERMAN, SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 15 (January 16, 1865), reprinted in
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATION ARMIES, 60, 60–62 (Daniel S. Lamont et. al. eds., 1893).
103 14 Stat.  at 174–75.
104 Id.
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it needs to be thought of as racial legislation.  After all, in South Carolina, it
seems likely that virtually every black person would have been a former slave.
While the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts contain multiple provisions, it is the
provisions providing assistance to freedmen and refugees that have received
the most attention.  Virtually all, if not all, of the other provisions are either
race neutral or provide benefits to former slaves.  Thus, the significant issue
is whether providing benefits to former slaves is race-based action, and, there-
fore, I will focus on that.
Eric Schnapper, the critic who has done the most work on the Freed-
men’s Bureau Acts, argues that these provisions are race-based.  While
Schnapper explores the legislative history of the two Freedmen’s Bureau Acts
at length, his explanation for why these acts are race-based is not as clear as it
might be.105  My best understanding of why he views these laws as race-based
is that they conferred benefits on former slaves, and former slaves were all
blacks.106  But this argument neglects that there is a strong argument that
the category of former slaves is nonracial.107
There are several strong reasons for concluding that the Freedmen’s
Bureau Acts do not employ an impermissible racial category under the origi-
nal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  First, the term “freedmen”
does not as a formal matter involve a racial category.  It simply refers to peo-
ple who were previously slaves and were freed by the Civil War.  While it is
true that all of these former slaves were blacks, not all blacks in the United
States were former slaves.108  There were certainly blacks who had been free
prior to the Civil War and some who had been free from birth.
105 Schnapper, supra note 74, at 762–75.
106 Id.  Schnapper’s argument largely proceeds by historical example.  Schnapper dis-
cusses the development of the various versions of the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts.  He also
reviews the arguments made in the legislative debates for and against the Acts.  But these
various arguments differ from one another and it is hard to know what specifically he is
relying on.  The core idea seems to be, as the text indicates, that all of the former slaves
were blacks.
107 Another problem with Schnapper’s argument based on the legislative history is his
unqualified use of the opponents of the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts.  These opponents, a
relatively small minority who in total consisted of less than one third of each house, argued
that laws that prevented discrimination against both blacks and whites and that provided
benefits to former slaves, were class legislation and impermissible. Id. at 763–67 (discuss-
ing opposition to Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 by Senators Guthrie, Hendricks, John-
son, McDougall, and Saulsbury and Representatives Chanler, Marshall, Ritter, Rousseau,
and Taylor).  Since these opponents also did not support the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment, one cannot accept their views of what constituted class legislation
to be informative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1809, 1861 (1866) (Civil Rights Act) (Representatives Marshall, Taylor, Ritter, and Rous-
seau voting against the Civil Rights Act; Representative Chanler not voting); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042, 3149 (1866) (Fourteenth Amendment) (Representative
Chanler, Marshall, Taylor, and Ritter voting against Fourteenth Amendment; Representa-
tive Rousseau not voting).
108 At the time of the Civil War, eighty-nine percent of blacks in the United States were
slaves. See JOSEPH C.G. KENNEDY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, POPULATION OF THE UNITED
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Second, while as a formal matter freedmen is not a racial term, it obvi-
ously has a strong connection and overlap with race.  Thus, even if one does
not treat the term as racial, one would still want to closely examine whether
the term was being secretly used for racial purposes.  There is, however, no
reason to believe that the term freedmen was being used in this manner.
There is an obvious reason why the Congress might have passed these Acts
that has nothing to do with the race of the former slaves.  These slaves had
been oppressed in the most extensive way and had not received a basic edu-
cation or learned the trade skills necessary to live self-sufficiently.  Moreover,
not only did they lack human capital, they also had acquired no physical
capital in the form of land or money.  Thus, it made perfect sense to provide
them with education, food, shelter, and land in order to allow people who
had been uniquely oppressed to enter society as free individuals.  Further,
even if one did not believe that these goods and services were needed to
allow the former slaves to live self-sufficiently, one might argue that the bene-
fits could be justified as a limited form of compensation for the harms these
slaves had suffered.109
Third, the bulk of the provisions under the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts pro-
vided benefits to both freedmen and refugees.  The term refugees would nor-
mally include whites, and once it is recognized that virtually all southern
blacks would be freedmen, refugees becomes a term that would appear to
have been intended mainly to cover whites.  If one were concerned that the
use of freedmen was an attempt to provide benefits on racial grounds, then
the inclusion of refugees should help to quiet that concern.  One question
that one must ask about a category that overlaps with race is whether that
nonracial category is being used as a subterfuge to benefit or harm a race.  If
the Acts merely provided benefits to freedmen, even though non-blacks were
similarly in need of the same benefits, then one might be suspicious of the
omission.  By contrast, if the benefit is extended to non-blacks in a similar
position, there is far less concern of it being a secretive attempt to provide
racial benefits.  I am skeptical that refugees really were similarly situated to
former slaves, but if one did think so, this would quiet that concern.  Moreo-
ver, there is evidence in the legislative history that refugees were added in
part because of concerns that the proposed legislation was seen by some as
race-based.110
Further, it is worth noting a significant portion of the 1866 Act operates
to prohibit discrimination or to provide benefits on a nondiscriminatory
basis.  This, as well, suggests that Congress was not intending to discriminate.
Overall, then, these arguments strongly suggest that the Freedmen’s Bureau
Acts were not race-based legislation.
STATES IN 1860: COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE EIGHTH CENSUS 7 (1862).
Of the remaining eleven percent, some, of course, were former slaves.
109 While it is not relevant to the original meaning question, it is useful to note that
Justice Scalia’s position, that it is not race discrimination to provide benefits to blacks who
were discriminated against, conforms to this understanding.
110 See Moreno, supra note 88, at 276–77.
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The strongest argument for treating the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts as
race-based is offered by Stephen Siegel.111  Siegel argues that various provi-
sions at the time of the Amendment, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
prohibited discrimination on the basis of “any previous condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude.”112  Thus, Siegel concludes that the Fourteenth
Amendment would also have treated the category of previous condition of
servitude as an impermissible category.113
Although not without some appeal, this argument does not withstand
scrutiny.  First, the fact that the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination
based on previous condition of servitude does not mean that the Fourteenth
Amendment also prohibited it.  As I argued above, previous condition of ser-
vitude is not a racial category.  While its overlap with race suggests that it
should be closely scrutinized to determine whether it is being used as a sub-
terfuge for race, the strong reasons for providing benefits to former slaves—
in terms of allowing them to become independent persons and as a limited
compensation for slavery—suggests there is little reason to see the Freed-
men’s Bureau Acts as a subterfuge for race.
Second, that the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination based on pre-
vious condition of servitude does not mean that Congress believed that this
category was racial or that it should generally be prohibited as class legisla-
tion.  There is an obvious alternative explanation for the inclusion of previ-
ous condition of servitude in the Civil Rights Act.  The Act was addressed
toward the Black Codes, which were laws passed by former confederate states
that denied blacks basic rights.  If these laws were prohibited, it seems obvi-
ous that the next step for the former Confederate states would have been to
pass similar laws that were directed not at blacks per se, but at former slaves.
Thus, the Civil Rights Act appeared to prohibit discrimination based on pre-
vious condition of servitude because the former Confederate states were
likely to use that as a subterfuge if it had not been prohibited.  This prohibi-
tion did not mean that all laws that employed previous condition of servitude
involved racial or class legislation.
It is true that the Civil Rights Act also prohibited states from providing
special benefits to the freedmen of the type that the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts
provided.  But it seems exceedingly unlikely that the former Confederate
states would provide those benefits and therefore the cost of this prohibition
was extremely small.114  Instead, the federal government was the entity that
was most likely to provide these benefits and the Civil Rights Act neither pur-
111 See Stephen Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998).
112 Id. at 559 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27).
113 Id. at 560.
114 Similarly, neither the non-Confederate former slave states nor the free states seem
likely to have passed laws benefiting former slaves.  The non-Confederate former slave
states seem unlikely to have desired to provide benefits to their former slaves.  And the free
states might or might not have desired to do so in the abstract, but very few recently freed
slaves would have been living in those states.
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ported to nor could prevent Congress from enacting Freedmen’s Bureau-
type laws.
Finally, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment reinforces the con-
clusion that the “previous condition of servitude” category is not absolutely
prohibited by the Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment equality com-
ponent used language (either the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges
or Immunities Clause) that is generally regarded as prohibiting class or caste-
based legislation—that is, legislation that imposes benefits or burdens on a
distinct class that is not justified based on an adequate public purpose.115  If
a law uses a subterfuge to discriminate based on race, then it will constitute
class legislation and will be prohibited.  By contrast, if a law uses a classifica-
tion, such as previous condition of servitude, that might be used as a subter-
fuge but in this case is innocently employed to pursue a genuine public
purpose, such as assisting former slaves to enter society as independent indi-
viduals, then it will be permitted.116  Thus, it would not be necessary to read
into the Fourteenth Amendment a categorical prohibition based on previous
condition of servitude.  Instead, the constitutionality of a classification based
on previous condition of servitude would depend on whether it was being
used as a subterfuge for racial purposes or to promote a legitimate public
purpose.117
115 See infra Part IV for a discussion of two theories that derive the Fourteenth Amend-
ment equality requirement from the Equal Protection Clause and from the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, both of which view the original meaning of the equality component as
prohibiting class or caste based legislation.
116 If the Civil Rights Act had merely prohibited providing a different set of rights to
blacks than whites (but had not prohibited providing a different set of rights based on
previous condition of servitude), then it is not clear whether the courts would have con-
strued the provision as prohibiting state laws that used previous condition of servitude as a
subterfuge for race.  It all depends on how expansively the courts would engage in aggres-
sive interpretation to restrain subterfuges.  Thus, it was necessary to add previous condition
of servitude to the Act.  By contrast, it was not necessary to add it to the Fourteenth
Amendment because such subterfuges would already be covered by the prohibition on
class legislation.
117 Schnapper also argues for the constitutionality of race oriented benefits based on
the claim that there is “substantial evidence that Congress adopted the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment in part to provide a constitutional basis for the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.”
Schnapper, supra note 74, at 785.  But since the Freedmen’s Bureau Act does not provide
race-based benefits to blacks, the evidence that Schnapper presents would not support
reading the Fourteenth Amendment to allow race-based benefits, even if it did establish
that the Congress had enacted the Amendment in part to provide resources to former
slaves.  But Schnapper’s evidence here is problematic because it is ambiguous.  While there
are some statements that suggest the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to provide a
basis for the Act, those statements could easily be understood as referring to the provision
in the Act that prohibits race discrimination as to civil rights rather than to the provisions
providing resources to former slaves.  Although this is not the place to examine Schnap-
per’s evidence in detail, it is my view that the evidence more strongly suggests that the
Amendment was enacted as a basis for the race discrimination prohibition.
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2. Other Laws
Let me now discuss various laws that do not focus on previous condition
of servitude but instead appear to classify based on race.  Jed Rubenfeld’s
influential discussion, as well as those of other scholars, focuses on five princi-
pal sets of laws.118  One 1866 law donated federally owned land in the District
of Columbia “for the sole use of schools for colored children.”119  A second
1866 act is said to have appropriated funds for the relief of destitute colored
women and children.120  A third 1867 law provided for money for destitute
“colored” persons within the District of Columbia.121  A fourth 1866 law
required military chaplains appointed for black troops to provide them with
basic educational instruction.122 Finally, Congress adopted special rules and
procedures for the payment of “colored” servicemen in the Union Army.123
While the critics claim that these five laws confer race-based benefits on
blacks, and at first glance they appear to do so, upon examination it is not at
all clear that they do.  The first two laws do not provide any evidence of pro-
viding special race-based benefits to blacks.  The third and fourth laws can be
reasonably interpreted as not providing such benefits.  The fifth law does
appear to provide race-based benefits, but it may do so under significantly
narrower grounds than the critics suggest.
First, while Rubenfeld presents the law that donated federal owned land
in the District of Columbia “for the sole use of schools for colored children”
as a special benefit to blacks, this appears to be a misinterpretation.124  Prior
to 1862, public schools in the District were limited to white children.125  In
1862, Congress initiated a separate school system for “colored” children.
Under a system of separate but equal, each of the school systems should have
received equal funding.126  The law that Rubenfeld identifies contributed
land to the public schools for black children.127  This contribution, there-
fore, cannot be considered in isolation from the other more general funding
provided to the two school systems.  One can consider this contribution as a
special benefit to blacks only if funding for black schools exceeded on a per
118 See id. at 758–78; Siegel, supra note 111, at 547–64.
119 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 343.
120 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 317.
121 Resolution of March 16, 1867, No. 4, 15 Stat. 20.
122 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 337.
123 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 367–68.
124 Rubenfeld, supra note 68, at 431 n.23 (quoting Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat.
343).
125 See Siegel, supra note 111, at 550.
126 Id.
127 That the land went to public schools is shown by the fact that the law states that the
land goes to the “trustees of colored schools for the cities of Washington and Georgetown,
in the District of Columbia.”  Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 343. See also Act of July
11, 1862, ch. 151, 12 Stat. 538 (referring to “a board of trustees of the schools for colored
children in the cities” of “Washington and Georgetown”); Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d. 14, 18
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (discussing the statute donating land for colored schools as going to the
black public schools).
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capita basis the funding for white schools.  Based on the operation of segre-
gated schools generally, this seems quite unlikely.  Moreover, the contribu-
tion of land for black public schools is entirely understandable without
assuming additional contributions to black schools.  If white schools had
been operating in the past, then it would not be necessary to provide land for
those schools, since they would have already been built.  But black schools,
which were just being started, would require additional capital contributions
to be erected.128
Second, Rubenfeld’s discussion of the appropriation of funds for the
relief of destitute colored women and children also appears to be misleading.
The 1866 law appropriated funds for the National Association for the Relief
of Destitute Colored Women and Children.129  The private association had
received a charter from the Congress in 1863.130  The Association, which was
initially located in Georgetown in the confiscated estate of a Confederate
officer and provided food and shelter, had been established because of con-
cerns about the plight of former slaves.131  Fugitive slaves largely from Vir-
ginia, who were known as contrabands, had entered the District of Columbia
and taken up residences in shantytowns and makeshift camps.132  One source
estimates that perhaps a third of the contrabands in the District died between
1862 and 1866.133  The National Association in 1863 became a home “for
sixty-four former slaves, most of them children.”134
In this case, the funding of the National Association, without more,
would be unlikely to constitute the conferral of race-based benefits.  The
funding of a private organization is not state discrimination unless the state’s
decision to fund it is based on a discriminatory intent.  Here there is no evi-
dence that the federal government had a discriminatory intent.  One nondis-
criminatory reason for the funding is that the organization appeared to
benefit only former slaves.  Another possible nondiscriminatory reason is that
it was addressing a serious problem of poverty through an existing organiza-
128 It is worth noting that this segregated school system was, of course, unconstitutional
under a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution.  In this section of the paper, I am
generally discussing laws that appear to benefit blacks, but the segregated schools may have
harmed them.  I will be discussing this segregation of the schools below in the section that
discusses laws that operated against blacks.  I raise the issue here only because Rubenfeld
treats the law as if it benefited blacks.
129 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310, 317.
130 Act of Feb. 14, 1863, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 650; Early History of the National Association for the
Relief of Destitute Colored Women and Children, FREEDMEN AID SOCIETIES, http://drbron-
sontours.com/bronsonnationalassociationforthereliefofdestitutecoloredwomenandchil-
dren.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
131 Carlton Fletcher, Historical Sketches of Glover Park, Upper Georgetown, & Georgetown
Heights, GLOVER PARK HISTORY, http://gloverparkhistory.com/estates-and-farms/burleith/
the-colored-home/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
132 Id.; KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE
OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 55–59 (2010).
133 CONSTANCE M GREEN, THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE
NATION’S CAPITAL 81 (1967).
134 Fletcher, supra note 131.
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tion.  Rubenfeld appears to have misunderstood this law because he presents
it as having the purpose of providing relief for “destitute colored women and
children.”135  But that is incorrect.  The law provides funds for the organiza-
tion with that name, not necessarily for that purpose.  Thus, the fact that
National Association’s purpose was to alleviate the poverty of colored women
and children does not necessarily mean that Congress’s purpose in assisting
the organization, given the circumstances at the time, should be understood
as providing race-based benefits to blacks.
Third, the proper interpretation for the 1867 law that provided for
money for destitute “colored” persons within the District of Columbia is also
more complicated than Rubenfeld’s brief discussion suggests.  Once the
background circumstances that led to this law are taken into account, one
might easily conclude that the law was not intended as race-based legislation.
To understand the enactment of the 1867 law, one must first review Con-
gress’s enactment of a similar law the previous year.  At that time, the Con-
gress proposed a law that would have provided funds just for destitute
colored persons.136  Opponents of the law criticized it on what amounted to
the grounds that it discriminated based on race because there were also
white persons who were destitute.137  Defenders of the law argued it was not
really discriminatory because the predominant need was by blacks, but they
were willing to allow the funds to be provided to all destitute persons irre-
spective of color if administered by the Freedmen’s Bureau.138  When the law
came up for reenactment the next year, however, Congress limited the fund-
ing to “freedmen or destitute colored persons” without explanation.139
We do not know the reason why Congress chose to change the benefi-
ciaries of the funding in 1867.  But that Congress modified the statute in
response to the objection of race discrimination the year before suggests that
it took the issue seriously and did not believe that providing money to blacks
was unproblematic.  One possibility is that, after observing the distribution of
funds, Congress determined that the advocates of the initial version of the
prior year’s statute were correct and that the predominant need existed
among blacks.  In that event, though, the 1867 law would still constitute a
race-based measure, even though some might see it as one that had a public
policy basis.
But this understanding of the 1867 law may view it as more race-based
than the evidence actually indicates.  When one examines the justification
given in 1866 for restricting the benefits to blacks, there is a strong argument
that the law was either not race-based or far less race-based than the discus-
sion above suggests.  In response to the criticism that the original 1866 bill
was racially discriminatory, it was defended on the grounds that there were
various places in the city where former slaves, known as contrabands, lived in
135 Rubenfeld, supra note 68, at 430 (quoting Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat 317).
136 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1507–08 (1866).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Resolution of March 16, 1867, No. 4, 15 Stat. 20.
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densely populated shantytowns.140  The poverty in these shantytowns was
extremely serious, with extended families crowded into six or eight foot
square rooms with no windows for light.141  These areas were also breeding
grounds for disease, since they had poorly functioning sanitation.142  Finally,
the people living in these areas were not being helped by the government of
the District of Columbia.  The explanation offered for this neglect is that the
contrabands were mainly refugees, who were not viewed as the problem of
the District of Columbia.143
This justification for the benefits then suggests a non-race-based reason.
Under this justification, these benefits were not provided to destitute blacks
because of their race or because there was a tendency for blacks to be in
worse circumstances.  Rather, Congress provided the benefits because there
was a special problem exhibited by the shantytowns in the District where only
blacks lived.  The blacks living in the shantytowns were suffering the worst
poverty in the District, were also part of a serious public health problem, and
were not receiving assistance from the local government.144  Under this view,
stating that the benefits should be provided to destitute blacks was a way of
identifying the people in these circumstances, since it was the most destitute
blacks who were in these circumstances.  As Senator Morril who explained
140 According to Senator Morril:
There are some ten or fifteen thousand of these people that have been thrown
into this city from the adjoining States, and they are existing here in a state of
almost utter destitution, inconceivable suffering, and want. The committee have
made their condition the subject of personal inspection, and have come to the
conclusion that as an act of humanity to these people, as well as a matter of secur-
ity to the public health, it is absolutely indispensable that some immediate relief
should be had for these people. They are now gathered in colonies on the skirts
of the city, in some instances close upon the thickly settled parts of the city, and
they are literally breeding disease and death.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess, 1507 (1866).
141 Id. at 1508.
142 Id.
143 Id.  The fact that residents of the shantytowns were blacks may also have been an
explanation for the failure of the District government to assist them. See MASUR, supra note
132, at 55.
144 As Senator Morril stated:
These colored people came here homeless, houseless, destitute, without shelter,
and without protection of any kind whatever, and were thrown upon this city with
no obligation to provide for them whatever. They are destitute and their condi-
tion is one of peculiar hardship and suffering to themselves, and of very great
hardship to the city. . . . The hardship of their condition is increased by the fact
that the city does not feel under the slightest obligation whatever to provide for
them. There are no poor white people in this city in that condition. The cases are not
parallel. It does not follow because the Government feels under some obligation,
as I trust they do, and know they ought, in this case to provide for this class of
destitute and unfortunate people, who are thrown upon this community, that the
poor white people of the District need something from the Treasury of the
United States.
Id. at 1508 (emphasis added).
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the law to the Senate stated, “there are no poor white people in this city in
that condition.”145
Under this interpretation, the law would not have been intended as a
race-based measure, but instead as a measure to deal with poverty and related
problems that happened to have afflicted blacks.146  Of course, under mod-
ern equal protection analysis, this statute would be likely to be viewed as race-
based—or at least as presumptively race-based—because it draws a textual
racial distinction.  If the statute were defended as non-race-based, the
counter-inquiry would ask why Congress had not passed a textually race-neu-
tral statute—by either listing the areas that were subject to the extreme pov-
erty, health effects, and neglect by the local government or by limiting the
payment of benefits to the people with the greatest poverty living in areas
that had these three characteristics.  Although the first option may have been
impeded by Congress’s apparent lack of knowledge of all of the relevant
areas, it is not clear why the second would not have worked.147
While this formal focus on the statutory text would treat the statute as
race-based, there is a strong argument that it should not be viewed as race-
based for purposes of our inquiry into Congress’s understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Congress knew that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not apply to this statute.  Therefore, there was no particular reason for Con-
gress to conform to the constitutional rule that treated textual distinctions
based on race as being especially problematic.  Instead, it might have
believed that the vague political norm against class legislation could have
been satisfied by a statute that was justified as having been intended to
address a race-neutral matter.  Thus, the possibility that the statute would
have been unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment does not nec-
essarily suggest that Congress would have viewed race-based statutes that ben-
145 Id.
146 It should be noted that there is strong support for reading the statute as limiting
benefits to the people living in these shantytown areas.  If one looks to Congress’s intent,
then the evidence of intent supports interpreting the statute as limiting to these areas. See
supra text accompanying notes 129–40.  But even if one looks to the statutory text, a similar
result obtains.  To begin with, it is certainly the case that this statute allows the executive to
allocate the funds to these shantytown areas.  The poverty occurring there was extremely
serious and the other circumstances, such as local government neglect and public health
hazards, made it all the more reasonable to spend the money there.  But it also seems very
likely that the executive would have been required to spend the money in these areas.
Based on the legislative history, it seems that the worst poverty in the District existed in
these areas.  If that is true, then spending the funds for other purposes, especially when the
additional matters of public health and local government neglect are considered, would
seem to be an abuse of discretion.  Thus, there is a strong case that, given the circum-
stances existing at the time, the money could only be legally used on these shantytowns.
Moreover, the fact that the money was enacted for only a one-year period enhances the
argument, because it makes it more likely that the circumstances that Congress assumed
existed would continue to do so during the entire duration of the law.
147 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1507–08 (1866) (statement of A.C. Richards,
Superintendent of Washington, D.C.) (stating that the D.C. inspector still has not had the
opportunity to identify and list all of the shantytown areas).
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efited blacks as uncontroversial.  Rather, Congress might have viewed this
statute as having a race-neutral purpose and therefore as not race-based.
And since the only inference that one might draw in favor of the critics’ view
from this statute turns on Congress’s values, the fact that Congress might
have viewed this statute as not race-based greatly reduces the support for this
inference.
There is also another way to see the statute as not providing race-based
benefits to blacks.  Under this view, one notes that the blacks who lived in
these shantytowns were, according to the legislative history, largely former
slaves.  Thus, one non-race-based reason why the funds might have been pro-
vided was their status as former slaves rather than their race.
Of course, the 1867 law did not merely provide benefits to former slaves,
but also to blacks.  But there are non-raced-based reasons for extending the
benefits to blacks.  The law might have extended the benefits beyond slaves
to blacks generally based on the view that it would have been difficult to
prove that the beneficiaries were former slaves.  In the shantytown areas, the
level of poverty would make it very unlikely that the recipients could prove or
provide formal evidence that they were former slaves.148  Conferring benefits
on blacks who lived in areas where nearly everyone was a former slave would
avoid the need for proving former servitude while nonetheless limiting bene-
fits largely to former slaves.149
The fourth statute involves a provision that requires chaplains appointed
for “colored troops” to instruct these troops “in the common English
branches of education.”150  Siegel claims that “the chaplains for white troops
had no similar responsibilities.”151  Thus, he suggests that black troops were
provided more educational benefits than white troops.152  But the claim that
this statute is an example of race-based benefits for blacks is once again not
proven, since it may not have provided any special benefits to black soldiers.
To begin with, it is not clear to what extent, if any, black soldiers
received educational benefits that white soldiers did not.  Depending on how
148 The difficulty of proving one’s status appears not to have been uncommon. See, e.g.,
GREEN, supra note 133, at 59 (“A Negro refugee from Virginia might have difficulty in
proving that he was not a Maryland fugitive salable for jail fees when no master claimed
him.”).
149 Another reason the law might have extended the benefits beyond former slaves to
the few additional blacks living in these shantytowns might have been based on the view
that improving the conditions in the shantytowns required that benefits be provided to all
recipients there.  It is possible that the law would have provided relief to these areas in the
form of shelter, food, and sanitation.  Given the density of the population, providing relief
to some of the inhabitants of these areas, without providing relief to others, might have
been difficult.  For example, if shelter or sanitation were provided in these areas to some
inhabitants, it might be hard to effectively deny these benefits to the other inhabitants of
these areas.  Improving sanitation for some would probably require improving it for most
or all of the inhabitants.
150 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 337; see Siegel, supra note 111, at 560–61.
151 Siegel, supra note 111, at 560–61.
152 Id.
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one interprets the statutory scheme and what the circumstances were at the
time, there are at least two ways that black soldiers would have been provided
no more benefit than comparable white soldiers.  First, at the time, Congress
had required that there be schools at all army bases.153  Since white soldiers
could attend these schools when stationed at bases, this suggests that the pro-
vision requiring chaplains to instruct black troops would have provided addi-
tional benefits to black soldiers only when they were not stationed at army
bases.
But this understanding may overstate the differences in treatment
between black and white soldiers.  Because one of the traditional duties of
chaplains was to provide education, it is sensible to interpret the duties of
chaplains assigned to white troops as at least allowing that they provide edu-
cational instruction and probably requiring that they do so when circum-
stances justified it.154  White soldiers who required instruction may therefore
have received it even when not present at army bases.
Given that black soldiers were in general far less educated than white
soldiers due to slavery and other causes, it is not at all clear that these provi-
sions would have provided the white soldiers who required instruction any
less instruction than the black soldiers who required it.  The chaplains in
black regiments would have had many more soldiers to instruct and there-
fore any additional time when they were required to instruct the black
soldiers might not have resulted in more instruction per soldier for blacks
than for whites.
In addition to not conferring additional benefits on black soldiers, these
provisions might also have been motivated by race-neutral considerations.
First, Congress might have adopted this statutory scheme because it believed
that providing instruction to white troops in this manner (requiring it on
army bases and authorizing it when off these bases) would have adequately
provided education to the limited number of white troops who required it,
but would not have been sufficient for the greater percentage of black troops
who needed it.  In the case of black troops, requiring the chaplains to pro-
vide instruction while off base might have been needed to provide sufficient
instruction.  Second, Congress might have feared that the white chaplains,
who were providing the education, would be prejudiced against instructing
black soldiers, believing that educating blacks was not appropriate.155  In that
event, Congress’s decision to require education for black troops would have
153 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 336.
154 See Act of July 8, 1838, ch. 162, 5 Stat. 259; JACK FONER, THE UNITED STATES SOLDIER
BETWEEN TWO WARS 25–27 (1970).  If the chaplains were required to exercise their duties
reasonably, then they might have been required to provide education to white troops need-
ing it unless there was a good reason for not doing so.
155 The concern about prejudice against educating blacks gains support from the fact
that the armed forces segregated blacks and excluded them from the services that required
more training and intelligence. See infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
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been based not on providing additional instruction to blacks but simply
ensuring that they received the same instruction as whites did.156
The second way that black soldiers would not receive additional benefits
derives from a different interpretation of the statutory scheme.  Under this
interpretation, the provision requiring chaplains to provide instruction for
black soldiers might have been understood as applying entirely or mainly
when those soldiers were at army bases.  Consequently, black soldiers would
not receive more instruction than white soldiers, who would also receive
instruction at army bases (and on occasion in other places).  This interpreta-
tion of the provision as being largely limited to instruction at army bases
would gain force if, as seems plausible, instruction mainly occurred at army
bases and was more difficult to provide when off base.
The main question for this interpretation is why Congress would have
added a special provision requiring instruction of black soldiers when there
was already a provision requiring schools at army bases.  The explanation for
this provision would be that Congress feared that the schools might have
excluded the black soldiers.  As discussed below, the armed forces already
discriminated against black soldiers, especially as to positions requiring
greater learning.157  Moreover, there is some evidence that the schools were
segregated, suggesting a hostility towards instruction by black soldiers.158  In
the absence of a provision requiring instruction to black soldiers, Congress
might have been concerned that the black soldiers would not receive educa-
tion from the schools.  By requiring that the chaplains for the black soldiers
provide education, Congress would have ensured that the black soldiers
would have been taught by the chaplains for their regiments.
Under either of these scenarios, then, the provision requiring instruc-
tion for black soldiers would not have operated to, nor have been intended
to, provide special benefits to blacks that comparable white soldiers would
not receive.  Instead, in both cases, Congress might have simply been address-
ing the special circumstances that the black soldiers were in—that a greater
percentage of the black soldiers required instruction and that there was
prejudice against instructing blacks.
It might be objected that whatever benefits were provided to the black
troops were race-based benefits because the statutory provision drew a racial
distinction.  While this objection might have some force in a different con-
text, it has much less force given the legal landscape at the time.  The distinc-
156 One might object that providing additional protections for blacks based on the
belief that they would face prejudice might constitute a form of special benefits.  That is by
no means clear.  If blacks did face extra prejudice, failing to provide the special protections
might constitute discrimination against blacks.  Of course, the ideal race-neutral way to
provide protection would be a provision, such as “all soldiers who require instruction shall
receive it, with no discrimination as to race.”  But the armed forces were already segregat-
ing (and discriminating against) blacks and, once that grouping had occurred, it might
have made sense to frame the laws against that legal landscape.
157 See infra notes 174–79 and accompanying text.
158 See FONER, supra note 154, at 65–66 (discussing evidence of such segregation,
including army regulations in 1881, necessitating separate classrooms).
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tion between black and white troops was imposed by the armed forces, with
blacks being both segregated and excluded from various units.159  Once the
troops were segregated, it might have seemed sensible to draw racial distinc-
tions that served nonracial purposes.  Put differently, there might have
seemed to be little point to avoiding racial distinctions given the existing
racial segregation and exclusion in the armed services.
Finally, even if one did view this educational instruction by chaplains as
being race-based, it is hard argue that it was a genuine benefit comparable to
affirmative action in the legal context of the time.  Given that blacks were
both segregated and excluded from portions of the armed forces, these small
islands of benefits existed in a larger sea of burdens placed on black soldiers
and therefore hardly constitute a congressional determination that blacks
could be benefited but not harmed.
In sum, it is not clear that black soldiers received special benefits, and if
they did so, whether those benefits should be seen as a precedent for affirma-
tive action when they were merely part of a larger scheme of burdens that the
Armed Services imposed on blacks.
The fifth statute involved a provision that placed price controls on the
amount that could be paid to agents who helped black servicemen secure
bounties, pensions, and other payments that they were due.160  Such agents
were a common part of the system for paying servicemen.  In the case of
black servicemen, however, the Congress believed that many black service-
men were significantly overpaying for these agents’ services in part because
they did not understand how the payment system operated.161  As a result,
the Congress passed a statute that imposed maximum fees on how much
agents could charge black, but not white, servicemen.
Such a statute drew a clear distinction based on race.  While it therefore
constitutes the first clear example of a statute that confers race-based bene-
fits, the question is how broad of an example it is.  Does it suggest that the
Congress approved of a lenient standard in reviewing government benefits
for blacks or does it represent a narrow example of such benefits that might
satisfy strict scrutiny?  Here, I argue that there is a plausible case that the
statute represents a relatively narrow exception that might satisfy a moderate
version of strict scrutiny, although not the strict version that the originalist
Justices defend.
While this statute may have been based on the greater exploitation of
black servicemen, the details as to the situation facing black and white ser-
vicemen are important to assessing the justification used for the statute.
Although we do not have those details, one can easily imagine a version of
the facts that would have justified the statute as both benefiting black and
white servicemen.
Assume that blacks were much more likely to overpay their agents than
whites.  Assume also, however, that the price controls interfere with some
159 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
160 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 367–68 (1866).
161 Siegel, supra note 111, at 561.
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legitimate uses of agents.  For example, in some cases, the servicemen might
have additional issues that require extra effort on the part of the agents that
needs to be compensated.  In these cases, the price controls might prevent
the servicemen from employing the agents.  Under these circumstances,
imposing the price control on blacks but not whites might produce net bene-
fits for both blacks and whites.  By imposing the price control on blacks, the
relatively large number of blacks who would overpay the agents would be
protected.  It is true that blacks who would benefit from the additional ser-
vices from agents would be harmed, but that number might be smaller than
the larger number of blacks who would be harmed by the exploitative prices
charged by the agents.
In contrast, whites as a group might have been better off being excluded
from the price controls.  If a relatively small percentage of whites were being
exploited by agents, then the benefits from the price controls for them would
be small.  The costs to the whites from not being able to use agents in the
more complicated cases, then, would be larger than the benefits from the
price control.162
These benefits from the race-based legislation, moreover, might not oth-
erwise have been obtainable without this racial distinction if there were no
other way for the Congress to determine which groups were the most in need
of protection.  It might be thought that Congress could have imposed the
price controls only on servicemen who were likely to be vulnerable to
exploitation, such as servicemen who had not received a certain level of edu-
cation.  But it is not clear that Congress had a better filter than race.  For
example, while education might seem like a useful filter, it is quite possible
that, in a world in which many people had not received much formal school-
ing, educational attainment would not be a good means of determining who
could protect themselves against exploitation.163
162 Let me illustrate the point made in the text with an example.  Suppose that the
Armed Forces consists of 800 whites and 200 blacks.  Assume that ten percent of blacks
(twenty people) will be exploited by agents whereas only three percent of whites (twenty-
four people) will be.  Assume also that the same percentage of blacks and whites—five
percent—require additional services by agents, so that ten blacks and forty whites would be
prevented by the price control from employing agents.  Finally, assume that the costs to a
person exploited by an agent are equal to the costs from a person who needs the addi-
tional services provided by an agent but cannot secure them because of the price control.
Under these assumptions, the benefits provided by imposing the price control on blacks,
but not whites, would outweigh the costs.  The price control would benefit blacks as a
group (twenty blacks benefited, ten harmed) whereas the absence of the price control
would benefit whites as a group (forty whites benefited, twenty-four harmed).  Obviously,
the example depends on the assumptions that I have made.  But the point is that these
assumptions are plausible given the information that the Congress had collected.
163 After passing this provision, Congress in the next year passed another law that had
the Freedmen’s Bureau administer these provisions. See Colored Servicemen’s Claim Act
of 1867, J. Res. 30, 15 Stat. 26.  The Bureau received the checks for black servicemen,
ensured that the agents received only the statutorily authorized amount, and followed
other procedures to ensure that the agents were not abusive.  These provisions do not
really raise additional issues.  If Congress had the authority to impose the price controls,
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If this account of the legislation is accurate, then one might wonder
whether the legislation is narrow enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.  If it is true
that the race-based distinction benefits both blacks and whites as to receiving
the services of agents, and there is no other way of accomplishing this objec-
tive as effectively, then this legislation might satisfy the narrowly tailored
prong of strict scrutiny.
This would then leave the question of whether this was a compelling
state interest.  Neither of the originalist Justices, however, would appear to
believe that it was.  Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas appear to believe
that only the prevention of violence or imminent danger to life and limb
would justify racial discrimination.164  Thus, this statute would satisfy only
one of the two prongs of Scalia and Thomas’s version of strict scrutiny.  But
even if this statute fails the full colorblindness test, it would be much nar-
rower than the antisubordination view held by many of the critics, which gen-
erally allows harm to whites so long as it benefits blacks.165
Of course, it is not clear that this account of the facts existed either in
reality or in the minds of the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  But the point here—as
with some of the above statutes as well—is that this is a very plausible account
of the situation and it cannot be assumed away.  Therefore, it is very possible
that this was Congress’s understanding of the situation and therefore the crit-
ics cannot assume that Congress had a broader race-based intent in enacting
this statute.166  Moreover, even if this account is not entirely accurate and
Congress merely assumed that blacks were subject to much greater exploita-
tion and that it was difficult to find another means of protecting them, that
then it would have the authority to take actions to enforce them.  Similarly, if Congress
lacked the authority to impose the controls, then it obviously could not enforce them.  It is
true that having the Freedmen’s Bureau administer the program would have involved the
expenditure of government funds.  But administering payments to white soldiers would
have been conducted by the armed services, which also would have involved government
expenditures.
164 See supra notes 9–10, 28–29, and accompanying text.
165 There are at least two ways that this statute, given the understanding described in
the text, is narrower than the antisubordination view.  First, the racial distinction in this
statute confers net benefits on both blacks and whites as groups.  It is true that some blacks
and some whites would be harmed by the arrangement, but overall both blacks as a group
and whites as a group would be benefited.  This feature of the statutory scheme (which
might be thought of as promoting the public interest under Saunders’s view, see infra Sec-
tion IV.B) would be inconsistent with the typical affirmative action program, which bene-
fits blacks or other subordinate groups, but harms other groups that do not receive these
benefits.
Second, the racial distinction in this statute might have been necessary to produce
these benefits, because an alternative non-race-based distinction was not available.  This
feature of the statutory scheme would likely also be inconsistent with most affirmative
action programs.  If the goal is to assist those who are disadvantaged or who have suffered
discrimination, there are alternative methods for accomplishing these goals, such as affirm-
ative action based on socioeconomic status or for those who show they have been the vic-
tim of discrimination.
166 See supra note 162.
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would still suggest a considerably narrower understanding than the
antisubordination interpretation adopted by the critics.
Overall, then, these seven federal statutes passed at the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment do not support the critics’ claim that Congress under-
stood the Constitution to allow race-based laws that benefited blacks.  Even if
one puts aside that the statutes were passed by a Congress that did not con-
sider itself bound by the Amendment, these statutes do not necessarily
assume a view that the government has significant discretion to pass race-
based laws that benefit subordinate groups.  Instead, six of these seven laws
are either not race-based or can reasonably be interpreted as not race-based.
Only one of them clearly appears to be race-based and to fail the originalist
Justices’ version of strict scrutiny, and that law may constitute a far narrower
example of race-based legislation than the critics suggest.167
C. The Laws Harming Blacks
So far, this Article has discussed federal laws that benefited blacks and
asked whether those laws provide any strong evidence about the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  But this view of the matter gives one a distorted
perspective.  The Congresses that passed the laws that benefited blacks also
passed laws that harmed minorities.  Do these laws also inform the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and if they do, how they can be reconciled
with laws benefiting blacks to produce a coherent understanding of the over-
all meaning of the Amendment?
There are three basic examples of laws that harmed minorities.  First,
there were laws that involved school segregation.  As mentioned above, the
Congress maintained a segregated school system in the District of Colum-
bia.168  This segregated school system actually grew out of a more racially
discriminatory system.  Before 1862, the District’s public schools excluded
free blacks, who were forced to attend private charitable schools.169  In 1862,
however, Congress tasked the District with “initiating a system of primary
schools for the education of colored children.”170  While the legislation did
not require segregated schools, the District authorities maintained a segre-
gated system.171  The Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses revised the
legislative scheme without taking any action to desegregate the schools.172
Thus, Congress at the least allowed for the local government to segregate the
schools and may have even ratified the local government’s actions.173
167 See supra text accompanying notes 160–62.
168 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
977–80 (1995).
169 Siegel, supra note 111, at 550.
170 Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, 12 Stat. 407.
171 Siegel, supra note 111, at 550–51.
172 Id.
173 Stephen Siegel argues that subsequent acts acknowledged and ratified the segre-
gated system. See id. at 550 n.456.  Moreover, he claims that the system was unequal in that
it allowed whites to attend any school, but not blacks. Id.
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Second, Congress also allowed for both segregation and exclusion of
blacks in the armed forces.  A law passed at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided for the segregation of blacks in certain infantry and
cavalry units, and allowed for the exclusion of blacks from the other parts of
the military, including the artillery, engineer, ordinance, and signal corps.174
The manner in which this was done was a bit complicated.  When the
Thirty-Ninth Congress debated the Army Reorganization Bill, the assumption
was that blacks would be excluded from the army unless they were specifically
included.175  Based on this assumption, the Congress passed a provision that
allowed for the establishment of four separate units of infantry and two sepa-
rate units of cavalry for black soldiers.  No such units were included in other
areas.176  Thus, there was segregation for infantry and cavalry and exclusion
in other areas.177
One might question whether Congress’s assumption underlying the leg-
islation really represented the force of the act.  In particular, it might be
thought that the act did not require the exclusion of blacks from the units
that were not identified as black units.  But it is not clear that this alternative
view matters much.  First, if Congress made the assumption, even if it was not
legally correct, the assumption would reflect Congress’s views of the Constitu-
tion more than the actual legal meaning of the statute.  Second, even if the
assumption was not reflected in the law, the act would still be authorizing
government discrimination.  The statute certainly allowed the armed services
to engage in discrimination and did nothing to stop the discrimination that
the Congress knew was occurring administratively.
The third set of laws that discriminated against minorities were the natu-
ralization laws.  Until 1870, the naturalization laws extended only to white
persons.178  In 1870, Senator Charles Sumner sought to eliminate any racial
distinctions in these laws.  There was, however, strong opposition in the West-
ern states to naturalizing the Chinese.  A compromise was worked out that
extended the naturalization laws to persons of African descent but continued
to exclude the Chinese.179  Thus, racial distinctions were not only not elimi-
nated, but specifically continued by legislation in 1870.
These three pieces of legislation would appear to have significant impli-
cations for the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment under the critics’
approach.  After all, if the federal laws benefiting blacks inform the meaning
of the Amendment, then so should the federal laws that harmed blacks and
other minorities.  That would unfortunately suggest that the Fourteenth
174 Act of Jul. 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 332.
175 See Siegel, supra note 111, at 552 (“Congress debated the Army reorganization bill
on the presumption that failure to legislate inclusion of blacks meant continued
exclusion.”).
176 JACK FONER, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52–54 (1974).
177 Siegel, supra note 111, at 551–53.
178 Id. at 553–56.
179 Id.
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Amendment allows both segregation and laws discriminating against blacks
and other minorities.
Moreover, if one does conclude that these laws significantly inform the
Fourteenth Amendment, then it is difficult to know how one should inter-
pret the overall meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  One would have to
consider not only the set of laws that harm minorities, but also those that
benefit them.  Assuming that they all reveal something of the original mean-
ing, how could one reconcile the meanings underlying these laws?
While one might explore a number of possibilities, perhaps the most
plausible is that the state legislature enjoys significant discretion to adopt
what it regards as reasonable laws favoring or harming minorities.  Each of
these laws—the laws favoring blacks and the laws harming minorities—might
be thought to be permissible under a deferential approach.  Although I have
already explored the arguments for the laws favoring blacks, each of the laws
that harm minorities might be deemed to be reasonable as well.  Segregation
might be thought to promote educational quality in a world where the races
had often been segregated.  Restricting blacks to a limited number of segre-
gated units might be thought to be justified on a similar basis, with the lim-
ited units defended as the most that blacks were capable of filling at that
time.  Finally, the laws forbidding naturalization to Asians might have been
thought to take into account the significant cultural differences between
Asians and other Americans and the negative reactions those caused among
some U.S. citizens.  To be clear, all of these justifications for the laws that
harm minorities would now be rightly regarded as racist.  But if one were
inclined to view contemporary laws as informing the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, then one might be hard-pressed to deny laws that Con-
gress passed at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment were reasonable.
Such an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment seems quite
inconsistent overall with the text, purposes, and history underlying the
Amendment.180  In particular, the idea that the state legislatures—the
authors of the Black Codes—would be given authority to determine what is
reasonable discrimination against or for blacks seems extremely unlikely.
That interpretation would also be inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act.
By contrast, the jurisdictional understanding of the federal statutes and
the Amendment is superior.  Under this view, these various federal laws were
passed by a Congress that was not, and did not deem itself, bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, it possessed greater flexibility to pass laws
that reflected varying circumstances and varying views about appropriate leg-
islation.  But the set of laws produced by this flexibility did not reflect the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, the Amendment would
have needed to have been clearer and more restrictive to guard against states
that could not be trusted because they had shown themselves to be extremely
resistant to conferring equal rights on all of their citizens.
180 This interpretation does bear some resemblance to that adopted by the Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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IV. ORIGINALIST THEORIES OF THE EQUALITY COMPONENT OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
While the previous Part argues that the evidence relied upon by the crit-
ics does not support their claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original
meaning significantly allows laws that benefit blacks, this still leaves the ques-
tion whether there is evidence that the original meaning incorporates a strict
standard of review of all racial distinctions—that is, the colorblindness
approach.  This Part argues that strong evidence of a colorblindness
approach does in fact exist.
Although there are many theories of the Fourteenth Amendment, there
are far fewer theories of the original meaning of the Amendment, and even
fewer of the original meaning of its equality component.  In this Part, I
review what I regard as the two leading theories of the original meaning of
that equality component—the theories of John Harrison and Melissa Saun-
ders—to show that they can be read as adopting something like a colorblind-
ness approach.
These two theories are not merely the leading theories of the original
meaning of the equality component, but also representative of most of the
theories in this area.181  The two theories appeal to writers of different politi-
cal stripes.  Harrison’s theory is popular among conservatives; Saunders’s is
popular among liberals.  The two theories also derive the equality compo-
nent from different textual sources.  Harrison’s theory finds the equality
component in the Privileges or Immunities Clause; Saunders finds it in the
Equal Protection Clause.  Thus, a review of these two theories provides a sig-
nificant indication of what the existing evidence suggests about the original
meaning of the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that all theories of the original
meaning support a colorblindness approach.  Certainly, the critics do not
adopt this approach, and others may not as well.  But that the two leading
theories can be read to support a colorblindness approach suggests that
there is some significant evidence for that approach in the historical
materials.
A. John Harrison’s Interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
In an important article, John Harrison argues that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits laws that discriminate as to a limited group of basic
181 Harrison’s theory has been relied upon by various works on the original meaning of
the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green,
The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Pre-Enactment History]; Christopher R. Green, The
Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 219, 220 (2009) [hereinafter Green, Subsequent Interpretation]; McCon-
nell, supra note 168.  Saunders’s view has had a significant influence on, among others,
Jack Balkin. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2012).
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rights on the basis of race and other caste-like categories.182  Harrison
believes that this nondiscrimination rule applies equally to laws that either
benefit or harm individuals based on their race and therefore prohibits
affirmative action.
Harrison’s theory interprets the Fourteenth Amendment differently
than most approaches.  Harrison believes that the Amendment’s general
nondiscrimination rule does not derive from the Equal Protection Clause,
which he views as applying merely to remedial matters signified by the “Pro-
tection of the Law,” but instead from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Harrison criticizes the ordinary reading of the Equal Protection Clause on
the ground that the text does not provide for the “protection of equal laws,”
but instead for the “equal protection of the laws.”183  In other words, the
noun here is the “protection of the law”—which refers to the protective func-
tion of the laws that traditionally involved remedial matters such as enforce-
ment of the law and remedies.  The adjective—“equal”—modifies
“protection of the law” and thereby requires that the protection of the law be
provided equally.  Harrison argues that the protection of the law was a tradi-
tional concept and that protecting it equally would have been an important
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it would have assured that state
sheriffs and other officials could not ignore lynchings of blacks, but would
have to protect them from unlawful acts.184
Instead of emanating from the Equal Protection Clause, Harrison sees
the general equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment deriving
from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.185  According to Harrison, the
term “abridge” in the Clause prohibits states from passing caste-type laws,
which include as a core component race-based discrimination.  Harrison
argues that the term “abridge,” when applied to rights that are subject to the
control of the state such as common law rights, meant to deny based on caste-
based reasons.186  He also argues that this caste-based understanding of
abridge conforms to contemporary Republican ideas of equality.  And Harri-
son notes that some members of Congress at the time used the language as
he describes.187
182 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385
(1992).
183 Id. at 1390.
184 Id. at 1435–36; see also Green, Pre-Enactment History, supra note 181; Green, Subse-
quent Interpretation, supra note 181.
185 Harrison, supra note 182, at 1414.
186 Id. at 1420–22.  Harrison claims that the term “abridge” in Section 2 of the Amend-
ment, which penalizes states that abridge the right to vote of male citizens over the age of
twenty-one, had a similar meaning.
187 Id. at 1422–23.  For example, Harrison quotes Representative Samuel Shellabarger
who stated in 1871 that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “requires that the laws on their
face shall not ‘abridge’ the privileges or immunities of citizens.  It secures equality toward
all citizens on the face of the law.  It provides that those rights shall not be ‘abridged;’ in
other words, that one man shall not have more rights upon the face of the laws than
another man.  By that provision, equality of legislation, so far as it affects the rights of
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Harrison argues that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States refer to a class of rights known at the time as civil rights.  Those
rights, which were listed in various documents, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,188 include mainly
private common law rights and public protection rights.  Thus, they include
the common law rights to own property and make contracts as well as the
rights to sue and to testify in court.189  Under Harrison’s view, then, the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause protects equality for a large but not unlimited
group of basic rights.
Harrison argues that the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
is greatly informed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  He maintains that a prin-
cipal objective of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitu-
tionalize this Act and that only the Privileges or Immunities Clause can do so.
Under Harrison’s view, the Act’s prohibition on racial discrimination as to
civil rights is placed into the Constitution under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.190
According to Harrison, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would forbid
both laws that harm blacks and those that benefit them.191  First, Harrison
argues that both of these types of laws would have violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.  The Civil Rights Act provided that United States citizens “shall
have the same right[s] . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”192
This provision would certainly prohibit laws that discriminate against non-
white citizens, because such nonwhites would not “have the same rights as
white citizens.”193  But Harrison persuasively argues that it would also pro-
hibit laws that discriminate in favor of nonwhite citizens.  Under such laws,
nonwhites would enjoy more rights than whites and therefore would not
“have the same rights as white citizens.”194
In arguing for the symmetry of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Har-
rison does not merely rely on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  He also argues
that this symmetrical understanding was reflected even more clearly in other
statutes enacted at the time.195  Moreover, he maintains that this symmetrical
citizenship, is secured.”  Harrison, supra note 182, at 1423 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1871)).
188 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
189 Harrison, supra note 182, at 1416–20.
190 Id. at 1389–92.
191 Id. at 1458.
192 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2006)).
193 Harrison, supra note 182, at 1458.
194 Id.
195 Harrison notes that the Civil Rights Bill as originally introduced “did not use white
citizens as a baseline; rather its only reference to race . . . banned all discrimination on
those grounds thus prohibiting race discrimination as to whites.” Id. at 1458 n.276.  Sena-
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understanding of equality conformed to the general understanding of equal-
ity that Republican political theory employed.196
One important question in applying Harrison’s interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to modern affirmative action is how broadly
the Clause applies.  Harrison argues that the Clause applies to what at the
time were called civil rights—the core of which were private common law and
public protection rights.  But Harrison also explores the periphery of the
concept.  One question is whether government benefits count as a privilege
or immunity.  While it might be argued that no government benefits are priv-
ileges or immunities, Harrison claims that view is mistaken since there are
tor Trumbell said of that version of the legislation that it was a bill “to secure equal rights
to all citizens of the country, a bill that protects a white man just as much as a black man.”
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866).  Harrison notes also that the Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, which applied only in the “rebel states,” provided that a list of
similar rights to those in the Civil Rights Act “shall be secured to and enjoyed by all citizens
of such State or district without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery.”
Harrison, supra note 182, at 1458 n.276 (quoting Act of Jul. 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173,
176–77) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, Harrison notes that the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 banned discrimination on the basis of race as to public facilities and jury selec-
tion. Id.
196 Harrison’s analysis of caste-based abridgements turns out to be complex.  He main-
tains that Republican understandings of caste-based abridgements involve two types of
caste legislation.  One type involves laws that allocate rights based on certain impermissible
criteria that the Republicans treated as being unrelated to the content of the rights. See id.
at 1457.  Harrison argues that race, former condition of servitude, religion, political belief,
and probably sex, are the primary candidates for this type of caste legislation.  The second
type involves what he terms ad hoc castes—legislation based on animus for a group that
“represent[s] a division of the citizenry into classes for reasons unrelated to the content
of . . . [the] right[ ].” Id. at 1459.  Unlike the first type of caste legislation, legislation of
this sort would have been constitutional if it were not based on the animus. See, e.g., id. at
1457.
This analysis suggests that state laws that provide benefits to former slaves would be
unconstitutional for employing an impermissible criterion.  For the reasons that I discuss
earlier as to the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts, see Section III.A, I do not believe that Harrison is
correct about this, even within his own theory.  Harrison believes that caste-based legisla-
tion involves the application of criteria that is unrelated to the content of the benefits that
the laws confer. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 182, at 1457.  While applying matters such as
race, political belief, or religion might be deemed categorically to be unrelated to the
content of the benefits, this is not true of former condition of servitude, as I have argued
previously as to the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying
text.  Instead, Harrison should treat former condition of servitude under the second cate-
gory of ad hoc caste based laws.  If enacted as a subterfuge for race by, for example, the
former Confederate states, these laws would constitute ad hoc castes and be unconstitu-
tional.  Significantly, Harrison argues that the ad hoc caste category should be applied to
cover subterfuges. See Harrison, supra note 182, at 1464.  While Harrison appears to have
included previous condition of servitude in the categorically impermissible category
because it was prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and Harrison sees the Act as an
important indication of the meaning of the Amendment, I have explained why this aspect
of the Civil Rights Act should not be fully incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra text accompanying note 115.
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many examples of government benefits that would very likely have been
treated as privileges or immunities, including both the use of the public
roads and the protection of the laws.197
Harrison is not sure how to analyze the matter of public benefits.  His
suggestion is to follow the heavily Lockean flavor to the nineteenth century
analysis of privileges or immunities.  Under a Lockean approach, individuals
have natural rights that they bring into society and the purpose of govern-
ment is to secure those rights by defining them and protecting them with the
coercive power of the state.  Privileges or immunities, then, are those rights
and benefits that are either natural rights or are rights that are conferred by
the state in their place.  According to Harrison, when the government pro-
vides something that individuals have a natural right to acquire, and the gov-
ernment “either monopolizes its provision or forces citizens who obtain the
benefit privately to pay for it a second time by taxing them for its public
provision, then the benefit so provided is a privilege of citizens.”198  The idea
is that such benefits would have been provided in place of natural rights.
Under this view, “most government benefits with which we are familiar will be
privileges [or immunities] because most of them are supported by general
taxation.”199  One important government benefit of this kind is public
schooling.
An important question as to what government benefits are privileges or
immunities under Harrison’s approach involves government employment
and public contracting.  Harrison, again, is unsure how to analyze this mat-
ter.  He writes that “[i]f we regard services provided by general taxation as
privileges of citizens, we must then ask whether eligibility to be among those
who provide the services also constitutes a privilege.”200  While not certain,
Harrison’s “thought is that the taxpayer’s money purchases the service, not
the opportunity for employment.”201  The idea is that the taxpayer’s money
is being used to provide the service, so that the privilege extends to receiving
the service, not to the opportunity to provide the service.  If this is true, then
the opportunity to compete for government employment and contracts
would not be a privilege of citizenship.
One might, however, apply Harrison’s theory differently.  One might
conclude that the money extracted from citizens through taxes supplies not
only the service, but also the opportunity to provide the service.  The oppor-
tunity to compete to provide services to the government would certainly have
been recognized as valuable, even in the nineteenth century, and it might
therefore have been treated as an important ingredient of citizenship.202  In
that event, the exclusion from this opportunity on the basis of race or other
197 Harrison, supra note 182, at 1455.
198 Id. at 1456.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 1464.
201 Id.
202 The importance of employment provided by government entities such as the Post
Office was well recognized during the early part of the nineteenth century.
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characteristics unrelated to the right might have been regarded as an
abridgement of privileges or immunities.  Under this view, government
employment and contracts as well as services, such as state education, would
count as privileges or immunities.
Overall, then, Harrison’s theory provides significant support for the
claim that many forms of affirmative action are unconstitutional.  The theory
maintains that the Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination
in favor of both whites and blacks.  The main open question for modern
affirmative action issues is the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Under
Harrison’s tentative view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause extends to
most government benefits, including the provision of state education, but
not to government employment or contracts.  This position would mean that
some forms of affirmative action, such as admissions to schools and colleges,
would be unconstitutional, but that other forms, such as for government
employees and contractors, would not be, since the Clause would not cover
such matters.  By contrast, under an alternative interpretation of Harrison’s
theory, the Clause extends to both government services and the opportunity
to provide such services.  This version of the theory would extend to all of the
modern forms of affirmative action that have been challenged.
The broader version of Harrison’s theory would fully support the color-
blind Constitution view of the originalist Justices.  The narrower version on
its own, however, would support the theory only as to certain areas, but not to
others.  One way that the originalist Justices could extend the colorblind
Constitution to these additional areas would be through the use of prece-
dent.  I believe there is a strong argument, which I discuss in the margin, that
the precedent of Brown v. Board of Education203 and its progeny would allow
the Justices to apply the symmetrical understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment to areas not covered by the original meaning.204  Thus, overall,
there is a reasonable originalist basis for the colorblind Constitution pre-
203 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
204 The originalist Justices could apply precedent to extend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to areas beyond the original meaning. Brown and its progeny have been understood
to extend the Fourteenth Amendment beyond a narrow understanding of civil rights to all
nonpolitical laws. See, e.g., Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(prohibiting segregation as to public beaches and bath houses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (prohibiting segregation as to public golf courses).  One
question is how the originalist Justices could follow Brown’s extension of the Amendment
to non-civil rights, but not other precedents, such as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), that allowed affirmative action.  One way that the Justices could do this is by choos-
ing to apply precedents that are widely accepted, such as Brown and its progeny, but not
those strongly contested, such as Grutter.  It should be noted that while some originalists
reject precedent, many do not, including apparently the Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g.,
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 803 (2009) (arguing that the original meaning allows precedent to be followed
as a matter of common law).  For a longer discussion explaining how the originalist Justices
could apply precedent to extend the Fourteenth Amendment beyond its original meaning,
see Michael B. Rappaport, Affirmative Action, Precedent, and Original Meaning (on file with
author).
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mised either on the alternative version of Harrison’s theory or Harrison’s
preferred version combined with precedent.
B. Melissa Saunders’s Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
In another important article, Melissa Saunders takes a different
approach to the original meaning of the equality component of the Four-
teenth Amendment.205  Saunders argues that the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause imposes a prohibition on partial or special laws.
This prohibition forbids “the state to single out any person or group of per-
sons for special benefits or burdens without an adequate ‘public purpose’
justification.”206
Under this understanding, laws that draw distinctions based on race are
not necessarily unconstitutional.  Instead, it is laws that single out persons or
groups for special benefits or burdens without an adequate public purpose
that are unconstitutional.  Because many laws that draw racial distinctions do
so without a sufficient public purpose, such laws end up being unconstitu-
tional under the Clause.  According to Saunders, this doctrine prohibiting
special laws inevitably results in judicial discretion to determine when an ade-
quate public purpose exists.
Saunders roots this understanding of the Equal Protection Clause in the
development of a doctrine against special laws that emerged during the Jack-
sonian period.207  Such prohibitions grew out of a distaste for allowing
advantages to some persons at the expense of others.208  According to Saun-
ders, this focus on selective advantages for some also extends to laws that
impose selective disadvantages, because advantages on some amount to dis-
advantages on others.
While this doctrine first grew to prominence during the Jacksonian
period, Saunders writes that it eventually was embraced by the Republi-
cans.209  As a Republican principle, it became extremely influential politi-
cally as a means of attacking what the Republicans referred to as the
Democrats’ slave power.210  The Republicans claimed that the Democrats
used their advantages in the political process to confer special privileges on
slave owners and the institution of slavery.211
During the Jacksonian period, the doctrine against special laws was not
applied to laws that harmed blacks.212  But after the Republicans adopted the
doctrine, Saunders contends that it came to be understood as applying to
205 Saunders, supra note 80.
206 Id. at 248.
207 Id. at 251–63.
208 Id. at 253.
209 Id. at 249.
210 Id. at 265–66.
211 Id. at 249.
212 Id. at 264–65.
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laws that subjected blacks to special disadvantage.213  Saunders maintains,
though, that the Republicans did not hold this belief because they saw race
“as irrelevant to any legitimate governmental objective.”214  Instead, they did
so because they saw it as a “logical application of [the] broader principle . . .
that government should not use its power to create favored or disfavored
classes of citizens.”215  Thus, some laws that draw racial distinctions might be
constitutional.
Saunders believes that much of modern Equal Protection Clause doc-
trine can be rooted in this interpretation of the Clause.  In particular, Saun-
ders argues that the system of suspect classifications can be seen as consistent
with the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.  While she
does not believe the Clause was specially focused on the impermissibility of
racial distinctions, she argues that treating racial distinctions that harm
blacks as involving a suspect classification that requires strict scrutiny is really
just “an evidentiary device[ ] designed to facilitate judicial identification of
instances of special treatment that lack an adequate public purpose justifica-
tion.”216  When the state draws a distinction based on racial grounds, courts
legitimately apply a presumption that these distinctions are impermissible
“because our common experience tells us that they are situations in which
the special treatment is particularly likely to be motivated by prejudice or
favoritism rather than by a legitimate desire to further the overall public
good.”217
While Saunders does not discuss the issue much, she recognizes that the
doctrine of special laws might also operate to prohibit affirmative action.  She
writes:
[T]he antebellum case law does not tell us when, if ever, the need to com-
pensate for the effects of past official discrimination can justify so-called
“reverse discrimination.”  While the antebellum state courts made clear that
discrimination cannot be justified on the grounds of simple favoritism or
hostility, they never addressed the question whether compensating for past
discrimination was a legitimate public purpose justification.218
For Saunders, then, it all depends on whether judges believe that such
laws, designed to benefit groups who have been harmed in the past, consti-
tute laws for a public purpose.  Thus, Saunders’s view might lead one to con-
clude both that strict scrutiny applies and that affirmative action fails this test.
More specifically, the courts might draw a distinction between laws that bene-
fit a whole racial group, which would be impermissible class legislation, and
laws that benefit those individuals who were discriminated against, which
213 Saunders argues that the Clause was a compromise between the Radical and the
Moderate (formerly Democrat) wing of the Republican Party. Id. at 292.
214 Id. at 267.
215 Id. at 268.
216 Id. at 307.
217 Id. at 308.
218 Id. at 300 n.248.
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would not be class legislation.219  Of course, according to Saunders, courts
might conclude that laws that benefit previously discriminated-against groups
would be justified by a public purpose.  But the basic point is that judges
might conclude that the original meaning prohibited affirmative action.
While Saunders’s article offers a generally plausible interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause, some revisions need to be made to her argument to
render it fully defensible.  Once those revisions are made, however, her
approach will be even stricter as to race-based discrimination.  The ultimate
objective of Saunders’s article220 is to criticize the Supreme Court’s opinion
in the racial gerrymandering case of Shaw v. Reno.221  Saunders believes that
Shaw fails to appreciate an important distinction between laws that draw
racial distinctions and laws that racially discriminate.  Saunders argues that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not treat as problematic laws that merely
draw racial distinctions but do not racially discriminate (by singling out a
group for special disadvantages because of their race).222
Saunders’s objective here colors her analysis in two important ways.
First, she mistakenly assumes that the Equal Protection Clause applies to vot-
ing.223  This assumption is important, because whether or not the Clause
applies to voting greatly influences how one interprets other evidence as to
how strictly the Fourteenth Amendment scrutinizes racial distinctions and
racial discrimination.  Second, her concern to reject the idea that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits all laws that draw racial distinctions leads her to
understate the extent to which laws that either drew racial distinctions or
racially discriminated were deemed problematic.
In the remainder of this Section, I make several amendments to Saun-
ders’s argument and conclude that these amendments render her approach
considerably less hospitable to race-based discrimination.  First, I argue that
219 Saunders’s derivation of the doctrine against special laws may provide additional
support for concluding that providing benefits to a minority group is unconstitutional.  It
might be thought that providing benefits to a small group does not constitute a special law,
since the majority would not harm itself without good cause. Cf. United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that laws aimed at certain minorities
should not be afforded the presumption of constitutionality because such insular minori-
ties lack the normal protections afforded by the American, democratic political process).
But this is mistaken, since Saunders argues that the original version of the doctrine against
special laws focused on special benefits to small, politically influential groups. See Saun-
ders, supra note 80, at 253–54.  Moreover, it is not necessary for the law to directly harm a
group to be prohibited.  In fact, Saunders argues that the doctrine against special laws
initially focused on laws that benefited groups but that it also included laws that harmed
groups, based on the idea that a law that benefits some necessarily harms others.  Thus, the
original focus of the doctrine on laws that benefited small groups makes it directly applica-
ble to laws that benefit minorities.
220 Id. at 246–47.
221 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that redistricting based on race must withstand a
review standard of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
222 Saunders, supra note 80, at 311.
223 I say assumption because she does not really argue for the conclusion. Cf. Bret
Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909 (1998).
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even under a Saunders-type approach to the Equal Protection Clause, the
Clause does not apply to voting or other political rights.  Next, once it is
accepted that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
voting, the strongest evidence that Saunders presents for concluding that the
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all laws that discriminate on the
basis of race is undermined.  I then maintain that much in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the Equal Protection Clause forbids all
or most state laws that discriminate based on race.
1. The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause: Civil Rights and Political
Rights
The first revision that must be made to Saunders’s approach to the origi-
nal meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is her assumption that the
Clause imposes a prohibition on special laws as to voting.  Saunders’s view
here may derive from a textual argument.  The Clause’s requirement that no
“State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws”224 appears to apply to all laws.  But interpreting the original mean-
ing of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in general, and the Equal
Protection Clause in particular, to cover voting is surely mistaken for a variety
of reasons.  The text and history of the Amendment as well as the scope of
the prohibition on special laws all strongly cut against it.
First, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly suggests that vot-
ing is not covered.  To begin with, the terms privileges or immunities, consid-
ered in isolation, are unlikely to cover voting.  The privileges or immunities
of citizens were generally understood as referring to civil rights as opposed to
political rights.225  While the Equal Protection Clause might seem to have a
more comprehensive scope, the history suggests even more strongly that
equal protection was not understood to cover voting.  Numerous leading
Republicans indicated that it did not cover voting.226  Moreover, although
the Privileges or Immunities Clause confers rights on citizens, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause extends to all persons—both citizens and noncitizens.  If the
Privileges or Immunities Clause does not cover voting rights, then the Equal
Protection Clause is all the less likely to do so.  Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, it seems unlikely that at a time when not all citizens voted, the Four-
teenth Amendment would have extended the right to vote to all persons in
the jurisdiction.
These indications of meaning are strongly reinforced by Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 2 provides that “when the right to vote . . .
224 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225 See Harrison, supra note 182, at 1416–17 (“[N]ineteenth-century usage concerning
political participation confirms the close connection between privileges and immunities
and civil rights: neither was thought to extend to political rights, such as voting or serving
on juries.”).
226 See id. at 1438–40 (citing many contemporaneous statements by leading Republi-
cans, including John Bingham, Jacob Bingham, and Henry Wilson, that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause did not cover voting).
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is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, the basis of representation shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.”227  The most straightforward reading of this provision recognizes that
restrictions on the right to vote are permitted by Section 1, but simply
requires states that restrict that right to have their political representation
proportionally reduced.
Nor can Section 2 be persuasively read, in conjunction with Section 1, as
merely announcing the penalty for violating a right to vote protected in Sec-
tion 1.  Not only does the language of Section 1 fail to cover voting, but
neither Section 1 nor 2 reads as conferring the right to vote.  The draftsman-
ship would be extraordinarily poor (even for the Fourteenth Amendment) if
Sections 1 and 2 were intended to confer the right to vote.  When the Recon-
struction Congresses wanted to confer a right to vote, they knew how to do
so, as the Fifteenth Amendment makes clear.
This interpretation of Section 2 also makes perfect sense when read
against the history leading up to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Having ended
slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment, the Republicans had created a polit-
ical problem because the former Confederate states would now have repre-
sentation based on blacks counting as a full person rather than the three-
fifths representation that slaves were allocated.  But if the former Confeder-
ate states refused to grant blacks the right to vote, this additional representa-
tion would provide even more power to the former Confederates.  While
guaranteeing the right to vote would eliminate this problem, the nation was
unlikely at this time to support such a guarantee.228  As a result, Section 2
solved the problem for the Republicans by reducing the political power of
the former Confederate states to the extent that they denied blacks the right
to vote.
Finally, a strong argument exists that the doctrine prohibiting special
laws that Saunders argues was incorporated into the Equal Protection Clause
does not cover voting or political rights generally.  The cases that Saunders
cites from the Jacksonian period that helped establish the principle prohibit-
ing special laws do not involve voting or other political rights.229  Moreover,
227 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
228 See Saunders, supra note 80, at 266–67.
229 Saunders does cite one case that arguably involved political matters. Id. at 260 n.66.
In Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 (Md. Ct. App. 1860), the court questioned the
constitutionality of a law that provided “‘no Black Republican, or endorser or approver of
the Helper Book,’ shall be appointed to any office” within the jurisdiction of the Baltimore
Board of Police. Id. at 379.  In that case, a majority of the court questioned the constitu-
tionality of the law based on the principle that it would be unconstitutional for a law to bar
appointment based on someone’s political or religious opinions. Id. at 468.  A concurring
opinion questioned its constitutionality based on the law “add[ing] to the disqualifications
for office prescribed by the Constitution.” Id. at 484.  But neither of these bases appear to
have been derived from a principle against special laws.  Instead, Section 34 of the Mary-
land Constitution of 1851 barred the adding of qualifications for any state “office of trust
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the discussions in these cases rejecting special laws also seem inconsistent
with covering voting rights, since the right to vote was not enjoyed by all
people during this period, but the doctrine against special laws is framed in
terms of protecting all persons or citizens.  These points suggest that the pro-
hibition on special laws might have been thought of as being restricted to
nonpolitical rights or even more narrowly simply to civil rights.  Therefore, if
the term equal protection incorporated that prohibition, it would not have
covered voting or political rights.  This would be true, even though the
Clause’s language might seem to refer to all laws, because the Clause would
be incorporating a meaning that did not extend to voting.
It therefore appears clear that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not cover voting rights.  This conclusion is important, because it bears
directly on what might otherwise be strong evidence that the Amendment
does not impose strict limits on racial discrimination.
2. Race Discrimination and Special Laws
Saunders also argues that the enactors of the Equal Protection Clause
did not intend that all laws that either distinguish or discriminate on the
basis of race should be necessarily unconstitutional.230  Instead, she believes
that these enactors intended to prohibit only special laws and that such laws
do not include laws that merely distinguish on the basis of race and do not
necessarily include all laws that discriminate on the basis of race.
Saunders first attempts to support this claim based on the argument that
the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly consid-
ered constitutional amendments that would have prohibited all racial distinc-
tions or racial discriminations, but consistently rejected such amendments on
the ground that they could not be ratified.  Similar arguments against the
colorblindness position are made by Andrew Kull and William Nelson.231
While the Thirty-Ninth Congress may have opposed amendments that pro-
hibited all consideration of or discrimination based on race, that does not
mean that it did not strongly or even categorically oppose certain types of
laws that discriminated based on race.  Instead, it may have rejected these
amendments only because they restricted discrimination as to political rights.
The Congress clearly did not favor such prohibitions against discrimination,
as the eventual Fourteenth Amendment makes clear.  But the Congress’s
rejections of these prohibitions is consistent with it being strongly or even
categorically opposed to laws that discriminated based on race as to civil
rights or nonpolitical rights.
or profit.” MD. CONST. of 1851, art. 34.  Moreover, the Maryland Constitution also con-
tained provisions protecting freedom of religion and of the press. See MD. CONST. of 1851,
art. 33, 38.
230 Saunders, supra note 80, at 275–81.
231 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988).
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Saunders’s review of the proposed amendments that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress considered but did not adopt includes Representative Thaddeus
Stevens’s proposal prohibiting “racial distinctions” by the federal government
or the states as to political or civil rights; Senator Richard Yates’s proposal
prohibiting racial distinctions as to civil and political rights; Senator William
Stewart’s proposal prohibiting racial “discrimination” as to suffrage or civil
rights; Robert Dale Owen’s proposal outlawing for the federal government
and the states racial discrimination as to civil rights immediately and racial
discrimination as to suffrage in ten years’ time.232  But in each of these cases
the desire not to extend the prohibition to political rights is an adequate
explanation for its failure to be enacted.  Moreover, that Republicans
believed that an amendment prohibiting racial discrimination as to voting
could not be enacted provides additional support for this explanation.233
Saunders also discusses Representative John Bingham’s early proposal to
permit Congress to pass laws protecting the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens and people’s equal protection as to life, liberty, and property.  Saunders
writes that Bingham’s proposal would not merely have protected against
racial discrimination but also would have covered the rights of loyal white
citizens.234  While Saunders argues that this provision cuts against reading
the Fourteenth Amendment to strongly or categorically prohibit race dis-
crimination, that is by no means clear.  Rather, the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment might protect against other types of class laws does not mean
that it does not treat most or all race-based discrimination as impermissible
class laws.235
Perhaps Saunders’s strongest argument that the enactors of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not prohibit all racial discriminations as to nonpoliti-
cal rights is the comments by various supporters of the Civil Rights Act that it
would not invalidate laws forbidding interracial marriage.  Saunders notes
that the justification given for this view was either that “both members of the
interracial couple were subject to the same punishment” or “that members of
both races were equally forbidden to marry outside their own race.”236  Saun-
ders concludes that this view shows that Republicans did not find considera-
tion of race illegitimate so long as it did not single out certain persons for
special disadvantage because of their race.237
Saunders is certainly correct that these comments show that some lead-
ing Republicans suggested that some laws that drew racial distinctions as to
232 Saunders, supra note 80, at 276–78.
233 Id. at 277.
234 Id. at 283.
235 For example, John Harrison argues that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited all
caste type legislation.  He believes this category included not merely all racially discrimina-
tory laws, but also a variety of laws that might not be based on race, such as laws based on
political party or religion.  See Harrison, supra note 182, at 1461.  Also, Saunders argues
that a higher percentage of race-based laws would be unconstitutional because race is nor-
mally not relevant to any legitimate public purpose. See Saunders, supra note 80, at 335.
236 Id. at 275.
237 Id.
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nonpolitical rights were illegitimate.  It is important to note, however, that all
of these comments involved the Civil Rights Act and none concerned the
Fourteenth Amendment.  One might conclude from this that while the Civil
Rights Act did not forbid laws against interracial marriage, the Fourteenth
Amendment did.238
But even if one argued that these statements were applicable to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the real question here is how to interpret them.
While one could conceivably argue that this single example of interracial
marriage should be read as simply the tip of an iceberg allowing laws that
refer to or discriminate based on race, there are more plausible responses
that either do not credit these statements or see them as a limited exception
to a more general disapproval of racial discrimination.
First, it is entirely possible that these statements were deceptions on the
part of the leading Republicans.  Because interracial marriage was very
unpopular in many circles at the time, opponents of the Civil Rights Act
focused on the claim that the Act would invalidate laws prohibiting interra-
cial marriage.  It would not be all that surprising, however, if supporters of
the Act did not answer this charge honestly to avoid giving ammunition to
opponents of the Amendment.  This evidence that the Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment permit laws against interracial marriage is at
most an interpretation and application of the law at the time by legislators.
Especially under an original public meaning approach, it is the meaning of
the provision that is binding, not the interpretations or applications voiced
by some people at the time.  While it is reasonable to treat these statements
as evidence of the meaning, the weight of that evidence depends on a variety
of factors, including how the application fits with the semantic meaning of
the provision and the incentives and credibility of the authors of these appli-
cations.  That the Republican leaders had a strong incentive to deny that the
Civil Rights Act invalidated laws against interracial marriage—that it might
even have caused the failure of the Act to pass—certainly counts against fully
crediting their statements.239
Second, even if such statements were genuine, that does not mean they
are entitled to strong weight.  It is entirely possible that these Republicans,
knowing that so much turned on the issue, persuaded themselves that the
provision had this meaning, even though an unbiased interpretation would
have reached an opposite conclusion.240
Third, even if one credits the argument that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not invalidate laws against interracial marriage,
238 See David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause 6–11 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2240046.
239 For other evidence that these provisions invalidated laws against interracial mar-
riage, see Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1393.
240 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 182, at 1460 n.280 (“On this issue, the Republicans
either deceived themselves or decided that the only thing for it was a round untruth.”).
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one might still conclude that this was an exceptional case.  One might con-
clude that the Equal Protection Clause was thought to express a strong pref-
erence against racially discriminatory laws, but that this preference could be
overridden in exceptional cases.  To put it in terms of modern doctrine, it
might have been thought that laws against interracial marriage had to meet
strict scrutiny.  Given the strong distaste for interracial marriage in many
quarters, it might have been thought that such a law was the least restrictive
means of promoting a compelling state interest.  Under this interpretation,
there would be a strong preference against racially discriminatory laws, even
though laws against interracial marriage would be permitted.241
Finally, it is worth noting that even if laws against interracial marriage
were permitted, they would not be directly relevant to the case of affirmative
action.  Laws prohibiting interracial marriage involve the question of segrega-
tion and equality—whether separate is equal as to marriage.  By contrast, laws
engaging in affirmative action do not involve segregation, but simply inequal-
ity.  Put differently, even if a prohibition on interracial marriage were under-
stood as being a general law rather than a special law, that does not mean
that a government preference that was unequal, such as affirmative action,
would have been thought to be a general law.
Thus, the evidence that Saunders presents for concluding that the Four-
teenth Amendment enactors did not impose a strict limit on racial discrimi-
nation is considerably weaker than she suggests.
3. General Laws and Colorblindness
There is also additional evidence that Saunders neglects for concluding
that the Equal Protection Clause strongly restricts racially discriminatory state
laws.  Several statutes at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
racial discrimination within the sphere they regulated.  Most importantly, as I
previous mentioned in discussing John Harrison’s article, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 prohibited racial discrimination as to civil rights.  Significantly, the
Civil Rights Act did not simply prohibit laws that discriminated on the basis
of race that did not have an adequate public purpose justification.  Rather, it
prohibited all such discrimination.242
This aspect of the Civil Rights Act is particularly important because one
central purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorpo-
rate the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution so that a future Congress could
not repeal the provision.  Another significant purpose was to provide a con-
stitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act to guard against claims that Congress
did not have an enumerated power for enacting it.243  Thus, the Civil Rights
241 Another possible reason why marriage would not be covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment is that it was regarded as a social right rather than a civil right.
242 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2006)).
243 Under Saunders’s theory, it is not clear that Congress would have an enumerated
power to enact the Civil Rights Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  If the
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit all race-based discrimination, then what justifies
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Act’s categorical prohibition on race discrimination is particularly instructive
in understanding the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given the categorical prohibition in the Civil Rights Act on race-based
discrimination (as to civil rights), how can this important statute be recon-
ciled with Saunders’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as prohib-
iting class legislation?  In my view, the best way of reconciling this statute with
Saunders’s approach is to argue that race-based distinctions are particularly
pernicious and therefore that such distinctions are especially likely to be class
or special laws.  Put differently, the public purpose justification for justifying
distinctions in the law will be extremely difficult to sustain for race-based
distinctions.  Thus, the race-based distinctions as to the civil rights covered by
the Act will be categorically unconstitutional because no public purpose can
justify them.  While this allows Saunders to reconcile her approach with the
important evidence of the Civil Rights Act, it also significantly weakens the
claim that not all race-based discrimination, at least as to civil rights, would
be special laws.
A second statute enacted at the time that provides similar evidence is the
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866.244  Like the Civil Rights Act, the Freedmen’s
Bureau Act prohibited discrimination as to civil rights, although this Act was
restricted to states that had rebelled:
the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings con-
cerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment,
and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional
right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such
State or district without respect to race or color, or previous condition of
slavery.245
Significantly, this provision categorically forbids laws that racially dis-
criminate in favor of blacks or whites.246  Similarly, a third statute passed
some years later, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, also categorically prohibited
racial discrimination as to public accommodations, inns, theaters and other
places of public amusement.247  Once again, the best way of reconciling
the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on all such discrimination?  The statute would have to be
based on the claim that Congress has enforcement discretion to prohibit all discrimina-
tion, even though the Amendment only prohibits some discrimination.  This claim might
or might not be consistent with the original meaning.
244 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173.
245 Id. at 176–77.
246 Interestingly, Section 14 of the Act goes on to provide that “no penalty or punish-
ment for any violation of law shall be imposed or permitted because of race or color, or
previous condition of slavery, other or greater than the penalty or punishment to which
white persons may be liable by law.” Id. at 177.  While this might initially seem to simply
bar penalties that harm blacks, it actually bars penalties that harm or benefit blacks, since it
bars penalties “other . . . than the penalty . . . to which white persons may be liable by law.”
Id.
247 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
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these statutes with Saunders’s theory is that race-based laws were especially
problematic and deemed to constitute special laws.
4. Conclusion
While Saunders’s own version of her theory imposes significant restric-
tions on racial discrimination, these revisions of her approach render it even
less likely to permit laws that racially discriminate, including laws that specifi-
cally benefit blacks or other minorities.  Although Saunders argued that Con-
gress rejected several amendments that would have prohibited all racial
discrimination, an alternative ground for Congress’s actions, with a strong
footing in the record, is that Congress rejected these proposed amendments,
because they would have applied to voting.  Moreover, understanding the
Fourteenth Amendment as imposing a strong prohibition on racial discrimi-
nation is supported by several different statutes that the Congress passed at
the time.  Overall, then, Saunders’s theory, as revised, provides significant
evidence supporting something like strict scrutiny of state laws that racially
discriminate.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not clearly establish the constitutionality of state
government affirmative action.  Rather, there is at least a reasonable case for
concluding that the colorblind Constitution is the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and, in my view, the originalist case for the color-
blind Constitution is stronger than that for the antisubordination view.  The
federal statutes offered as supporting the constitutionality of race-based ben-
efits for blacks constitute weak evidence for that conclusion.  Moreover, there
is a strong basis for the colorblind Constitution in the leading theories of the
equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
